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Abstract
This dissertation, submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, is comprised of three
essays on networks and human behaviour.
The first studies the capacity for some agent in a network, who we term the ‘principal’,
to ensure the robustness of their network to potentially disruptive external shocks. Agents
susceptible to shocks may invest in contingencies but have insufficient incentive to do so from
the perspective of the principal. We derive results on the cost to the principal of overcoming
the resulting moral hazard problem. We focus first on the case where agents can only write
contracts with their immediate neighbors, finding that costs are strictly increasing in the
longest path in the network away from the principal when the probability of shocks is low.
However, we also find that for a fixed longest path away from the principal, a secondary
‘responsibility’ effect can cause costs to be lower when the average distance away from the
principal is higher. We extend our model to allow the principal to contract directly with all
agents but with additional information processing costs. We consider applications to supply
chain robustness to natural disasters and employee adherence to safety regulations in a firm.
The second essay develops a model of demand led innovation in supply chains and studies
the general equilibrium effects of demand shocks on R&D expenditure. It is found that
when no final good producers share suppliers, a positive demand shock will weakly increase
innovation in all firms. However, with common suppliers, negative pecuniary externalities
may reduce R&D expenditure in some firms.
The final essay was produced in collaboration with Dr. Matthew Elliott. It proposes
a new model of individual choice as a Markovian decision process over emotional states.
This approach allows for economic decisions to depend upon both an individual’s current
emotional state as well as introspection about how choices will affect their future emotional
state. The generality of this framework is shown formally before demonstrating its efficacy
in dealing with specific applications drawn from empirical findings in psychology and
neuroscience. Specifically, the role of frustration in gambling is explored, along with the
role of angry emotional responses in generating inefficiency and delay in negotiation and
bargaining.
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Chapter 1
Network Robustness and Contracting
1.1 Introduction
There are many settings in which an agent who is part of a network and derives some
surplus from that network wishes to ensure that the network is robust to external shocks and
disruption. Examples of such settings include: a final good producer ensuring that its supply
chain is robust to natural disasters; a firm owner subject to external inspections ensuring
employees adhere to safety regulations; the head of an organization ensuring its digital
networks are robust to cybersecurity threats; a bank ensuring its local financial network is
insulated from contagious default; or the head of a criminal organization concerned about
police investigation and attempts to dismantle their network.
These settings motivate us to study how such an agent might ensure the robustness of their
network to external shocks and disruption. For instance, consider a final good producer in a
supply chain who uniquely derives positive profit from their supply chain going undisrupted;
competition in input markets means suppliers operate at zero profit. All firms may be
susceptible to disruption by a natural disaster or not and, if so, can invest in contingencies
to avoid disrupting the network if they are hit by such an event. However, they do not have
sufficient incentive to do so from the perspective of the final good producer. The final good
producer will therefore have an incentive to write contracts that share some of their surplus
with upstream firms such that their incentives are aligned. We may therefore ask how much
surplus they will need to share to overcome this moral hazard problem and how this depends
upon contracting constraints and the network structure.
Therefore, in this essay we develop a simple network model where some agent, that we
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call the ‘principal’, uniquely derives a surplus from their network so long as it is not disrupted
by an exogenous shock. Nodes in the network may be susceptible or resilient to being hit by
an exogenous shock and, if susceptible, can pay some cost to invest in defense. This defense
technology is perfect in the sense that a shock will only disrupt the network if it targets a
susceptible undefended node. A node’s type and whether they have invested in defense is not
observed by the principal, however, the principal can align incentives by writing contracts
with other nodes that are conditional on the network not being disrupted.
We focus primarily on the case where agents can only write contracts with their immediate
neighbors in the network. In this case, the principal must write contracts with her neighbors
that both ensure they will invest in defense when they are susceptible but also incentivize
them to write subcontracts with their neighbors in turn, and so on. In this way, all nodes
may be incentivized to invest in defense when they are susceptible to exogenous shocks. We
consider acyclic undirected networks, also known as ‘tree’ networks.
We find that the surplus the principal must give up to ensure her network is robust to
shocks depends upon the network architecture whenever there are binding limited liability
constraints in contracting. Specifically, when limited liability constraints bind and the
probability of a shock is low, the surplus given up by the principal is strictly increasing in the
longest path in the network originating at the principal. Therefore, the principal always does
better in a network with a shorter maximal distance between her and any other node.
However, we also find that for networks with the same maximal distance away from
the principal of at least three, when the probability of shocks is low, it is not better for the
principal to have all other distances be minimized. Instead, it is cheaper for her if other nodes
are branches towards the end of the longest path away from the principal. Therefore, for a
fixed longest path away from the principal, the principal’s cost may be lower in a network
with a higher average path length.
The intuition for this is that in writing subcontracting chains an agent’s incentive con-
straint depends upon the probability of a disruptive shock were they not to carry on the
subcontracting chain. This probability is increasing in the number of nodes that the agent
connects with the principal, which we can think of as the ‘responsibility’ of the node. If
the responsibility of a node is higher, other things equal it will require the transfer of less
surplus to satisfy their incentive compatibility constraint to continue the subcontracting chain.
When shocks are unlikely, this responsibility effect dominates and it becomes cheaper for the
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principal when nodes are branches along the fixed longest path away from her, such that they
increase the responsibility of nodes along that path, rather than simply having the shortest
possible distance from the principal. In terms of applications, this implies, for example, that
in more complex supply chains (in the sense of more firms and greater branching) it is not
necessarily more costly for the final good producer to ensure robustness, if the longest path
in the network is unchanged.
When limited liability constraints are not binding, in line with existing results from the
literature on contracting structures, we find that the surplus the principal must give up is
invariant to the network structure and is simply proportional to the number of nodes in the
network. This can be thought of analogously to the principal ‘selling the firm’ in other
contracting problems without limited liability.
We go on to consider an extension of our basic model where the principal can contract
directly will all other agents but has to pay some additional cost to do so. This may be thought
of as information processing, communication, or travel costs. We show that when these costs
are constant or increase with the distance of nodes away from the principal in a linear or
concave way, for networks with sufficiently large distances away from the principal and a
low probability of shocks, she will always prefer to pay to contract with at least some agents
directly. This is because the surplus given up in subcontracting is convex in path lengths and
so will be greater than the constant, linear, or concave communication costs for sufficiently
long paths away from the principal. However, it should be noted that subcontracting in our
model generates no dead weight loss and so total surplus is lower when the principal takes
on information processing costs to contract with nodes directly.
We apply our results to two settings. The first is a producer monitoring the robustness of
its supply chain to natural disasters and the second is a firm owner monitoring adherence to a
safety regulation by her employees.
1.1.1 Related Literature
This essay sits at the intersection of two main literatures. The first is an established
literature on organizational structures, contracting structures, and centralization versus de-
centralization. The second is a nascent literature on the robustness of networks to external
attacks and the strategic defense of networks against attacks. We now give a brief summary
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of these bodies of work and their relationship to the current essay, as well as addressing a
few other related pieces of work.
There is a large literature concerning contracting structures and organizational hierarchies.
Mookherjee (2006) provides a detailed summary of this subject, the focus of which is on the
relative costs and benefits of decentralized versus centralized contracting structures. By the
‘Revelation Principal’, in the absence of information processing and communication costs,
constraints on contract complexity, and incomplete commitment, subcontracting structures
are weakly dominated by centralized systems where the principal contracts with all agents
directly.1 As discussed in Melumad et al. (1995) and Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004),
subcontracting generates additional incentive problems, typically in the form of the double
marginalization of rents. However, it is found that delegation performs at least as well
as a centralized structure under the following assumptions: observability of subcontract
costs; top-down contracting; risk neutrality; and the absence of limited liability constraints.
Another strand of this literature looks at the benefits of delegation when information costs,
communication costs, and contract complexity constraints are present; see Marschak and
Reichelstein (1998), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), and Melumad et al. (1992).2 Our results
draw similar conclusions on the efficacy of subcontracting, however, we consider a simpler
contracting problem but study more general networks. We derive results on the impact of
network structure on the efficiency of delegation more generally, rather than comparing star
and line networks of three or four agents, as in the canonical models of this literature.
Maskin et al. (2000) study the impact of organizational structure on managers’ incentives.
In particular, they compare multi-divisional and unitary management structures. They find
that multi-divisional organization provides better incentives to middle managers when there
is less variation in interregional performance than in interindustry performance. In the model
presented here, contracts can only be written conditional on exogenous shocks such as a
random safety inspection discovering an employee to be in violation of regulations. In
this setting we find that in some cases unitary type network structures will provide middle
managers greater responsibility and thus provide better incentives.
The second area of literature that our work is closely related to is concerned with the
optimal design and defense of networks facing external threats.3 Goyal and Vigier (2014)
1For a general statement of the principal, see Myerson (1982).
2These papers represent a mechanism design perspective on an old debate on the informational efficiency of
decentralized structures; for example, Hayek (1945).
3See Goyal et al. (2016) for a detailed review of this literature.
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develop a strategic model where a designer chooses a network and allocates defense resources
to specific nodes in the network. Subsequently, an adversary allocates attack resources across
nodes and chooses the path of contagion conditional on a successful attack. The success
of attacks is determined by a Tullock contest (see Tullock (1980)). They find that, when
defense resources are costly, a star network with defense resources focused on the central
node is optimal. This contrasts with the influential work of Albert et al. (2000) which argues
that core-periphery architectures such as star networks are particularly vulnerable since they
can be disconnected with the removal of only a few nodes.4 Dziubinski and Goyal (2013)
study non-contagious attacks against infrastructure networks that seek to disconnect the
network and how defense resources should be allocated in the face of such threats. The
model presented here differs from these papers in that we model defense to be perfect and
attacks/shocks to be non-strategic. Moreover, we consider a setting where the principal
concerned with defense of the network is located inside the network, such that the network
structure affects her capacity to ensure its robustness.
Another branch of work addresses the efficacy of decentralized defense. Aspnes et al.
(2006) study defense choices by nodes in a fixed network in the face of random attacks where
nodes care only about their own survival. They assume defense and contagion is perfect.
These assumptions are departed from in a more recent paper by Acemoglu et al. (2016). In
these papers, defense investment has positive network externalities which are not internalized,
leading to suboptimal protection.5 This work differs from our own in that we consider a
principal that uniquely desires to avoid attacks and study the cost of inducing investments in
defense when nodes can only contract with their immediate neighbors.
This essay is also related to work on supply chain management and potential disruption
of supply chains by natural disasters or other shocks. Recent studies by Ang et al. (2016)
and Bimpikis et al. (2018) consider three layer supply chain models with disruption risk and
find that market asymmetries, financial constraints, and features of the production process
can cause misalignment of risk preferences between upstream and downstream firms with
regard to multi-sourcing. The authors show that these asymmetries may be overcome by
under-delivery penalty contracts unless the incentive misalignment is due to non-convexity
4Robustness to exogenous shocks is also studied in a large literature in applied mathematics and computer
science on network reliability; see Fratta and Montanari (1973), Colbourn (1987), Bell and Iida (1997), and
Alpcan and Basar (2010). This work focuses on calculating the probability of a path existing between two
nodes in the presence of exogenous shocks, known as ‘terminal-reliability’.
5This work is closely related to a very active area of research on financial contagion; see Allen and Gale
(2000), Elliott et al. (2014), and Caballero and Simsek (2013).
6 Network Robustness and Contracting
in the production process. In contrast, we do not model the production process explicitly
but consider more general network structures. We also focus on the case where liability is
limited such that under-delivery penalties are insufficient to ensure incentive compatibility.
Note that such penalties often have credibility issues, especially in cases of natural disaster.
Sheffi (2001) considers the impact of terrorism and government responses to terrorism on
supply chain management and argues that there may be a trade off between having multiple
alternative suppliers in order to meet demand and having strong ties with a few core suppliers
to increase the chance that, in the event of rationing, the supplier favors your firm. Here we
do not explicitly consider the strength of links.
A substantial literature on incomplete contracts, see Grossman and Hart (1986) and Antràs
(2005), shows that contractual costs and frictions have empirically important implications for
the organization of production and firm boundaries. While we do not consider incomplete
contracts, our results on the impact of network structure on the cost of contracting to ensure
network robustness similarly offer insights into the feasibility and desirability of different
production systems.
To the best of our knowledge, this essay represents some of the first work on contracting
and subcontracting structures in a general class of acyclic networks. We develop novel results
on how the cost of aligning incentives across a network depends upon network structure and
offer a variety of interesting applications to common network robustness problems.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section1.2 sets out the model.
Section 1.3 presents our results on contracting in line networks and contracting in general
acyclic networks, before considering a generalization of our model where the principal can
contract directly with all agents but at a cost. Section 1.4 addresses two applications, namely
to supply chain robustness to natural disasters and employee adherence to a safety regulation,
and provides discussion. Section 1.5 offers concluding remarks.
1.2 Model
Networks:
There is a finite set N = {1, . . . ,n} of agents (or ‘nodes’) on a network g. Let i and j
be typical elements of N and denote by gi j a relationship between i and j. Specifically, if i
has a link to j we say gi j = 1, otherwise gi j = 0. We will say that there is a path from i to
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j if gi j = 1 or there exists a set of distinct nodes j1, j2, . . . , jk such that gi j1 = g j1 j2 = · · ·=
g jk−1 jk = g jk j = 1. We will refer to the geodesic distance between two nodes as d(i, j), this
being the number of distinct edges on the shortest path between i and j. We will assume g
is a connected network; specifically, there exists a path between all pairs of nodes. We will
further assume that there is a unique path between all nodes, such that g contains no cycles
(also known as a ‘tree’ network).6 We will also assume g is an undirected network; that is
to say, gi j = g ji for all i, j ∈ N. We will refer to Ni(g) = { j ∈ N | gi j = 1}, as the set of i’s
neighbors in g. One agent in the network will be the ‘principal’, who we denote by p.
Information:
In period zero, types are drawn. We will denote the type of node i by θi. Each node may
be one of two distinct types: ‘susceptible’ or ‘resilient’, which we will denote by θ s and
θ r, respectively. Types are private information. We will assume that types are independent
and agents have common priors over types. We will denote the common knowledge prior
belief that agent i is susceptible, Pr(θi = θ s), by ρi. The structure of the network is common
knowledge.
In period three, there may be an exogenous shock on the network. If a shock occurs,
it will ‘target’ exactly one node, which we will denote by τ . All nodes have a commonly
known probability of being the target given by ε , where nε < 1. That is to say, the target of
the shock is not chosen strategically but is selected at random.7 For ease of exposition, we
will assume that the principal is resilient.8
Actions:
In period two, each node may take an action which may be thought of as ‘investing in
defense/contingencies’. Specifically, each i will choose Ii ∈ {0,1}, which incurs them a cost
k. A susceptible type node that invests in defense becomes immune to shocks. That is to say,
in period three, if a shock occurs, we will say it is ‘disruptive’ if and only if the randomly
selected target node is the susceptible type and, additionally, has not invested in defense.
6If g contained cycles this would not affect our results but introduces the possibility of multiple equivalent
equilibria; we abstract from this for expositional clarity.
7Allowing for heterogeneity in the probability of being the target would not substantially affect the results
presented below.
8If p were susceptible then, for any interesting parameter values, p would always invest in defense (see
below) and her payoff would simply be shifted by a constant; namely, −k, the cost of investing in defense.
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Formally, a disruptive shock occurs if and only if, for the randomly selected target τ , θτ = θ s
and Iτ = 0.
Crucially, we will assume that ex-ante only the principal has an incentive to avoid a shock
disrupting the network; i.e. the principal uniquely receives a surplus, S, in the case of no
disruptive shock.9 Therefore, where possible, she will wish to align incentives such that the
other nodes undertake the costly investment in defense when they are susceptible. We will
focus on when aligning incentives in this way can be achieved through writing only local
contracts conditional on whether a successful attack occurs.
Specifically, in period one, all agents may write contracts with their immediate neighbors
and only their immediate neighbors. Formally, i can write a contract with j if and only if
j ∈ Ni(g) = { j ∈ N | gi j = 1}. These contracts must be of the form (tGi j , tBi j), where tGi j is the
transfer that i makes to j conditional on no disruptive shock (i.e. the ‘good’ state), and tBi j is
the transfer that i makes to j conditional on a disruptive shock (i.e. the ‘bad’ state).
Note that tBi j will typically be negative, meaning a transfer from j to i, corresponding to a
penalty or fine. We will mostly assume that these penalties are restricted in the sense of a
(pairwise) limited liability constraint of the following form. For all i and j, it must be that
|tBi j − tBji| ≤ L. Therefore, penalties cannot be larger than L. As L goes to infinity, we have the
unconstrained case with no limits on liability.
It should be noted that contracts cannot be written conditional on which node is suc-
cessfully attacked. This assumption is plausible in some settings, such as when the attack
is contagious, but is mostly for tractability and does not effect our results substantially; for
instance, it is equivalent when L = 0. We also assume contracts cannot be made conditional
on actions, i.e. investing in defense. It is assumed that these actions are not publicly verifiable;
only whether a successful attack has occurred will be publicly verifiable. Furthermore, since
an agent can only contract with her neighbors, for the principal to incentivize investment in
defense by an agent of whom she is not a neighbor, she would have to utilize subcontracting.10
In line with much of the literature on organizational hierarchies and subcontracting, we
9The assumption that only the principal has an incentive to defend the network is an abstraction that allows
us to focus on her ability to align incentives while retaining tractability in the model. However, in some settings
this assumption is plausible; for instance, in supply chains, with sufficient competition and free entry, firms
other than the final good producer will be making zero profits and as such have no incentive to defend the
supply chain. Applications are discussed more in section 1.4.
10For comparison, we consider a case where the principal can contract with all nodes directly in section
1.3.3.
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will additionally impose ‘Top-Down Contracting’. That is to say, within period one, p first
makes contracts with her neighbors; only after accepting or rejecting a contract can these
agents then offer contracts to their other neighbors, and so on. Since we are considering
acyclic networks this process will terminate in finite steps.
Payoffs:





(tBji − tBi j)− kIi if there has been a ‘disruptive shock’,
∑
j∈Ni(g)
(tGji − tGi j )− kIi otherwise,
(1.1)





(tBip − tBpi) if there has been a ‘disruptive shock’,
∑
i∈Np(g)
(tGip − tGpi)+S otherwise.
(1.2)
We will generally assume Sε − k > 0, such that it is socially efficient for all nodes to
invest when they are susceptible.
Timing:
The timing of the game is as follows. There is no temporal discounting.
• In period zero, all nodes privately draw their types.
• In period one, contracts are written via ‘Top-Down Contracting’; i.e the principal first
offers contracts to her neighbors who must accept or reject the contract before being
allowed to write contracts with their other neighbors, and so on, as described above.
• In period two, nodes can choose to invest in defense.
• In period three, whether or not a disruptive shock occurs is realized and nodes receive
their payoffs.
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We will consider pure-strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibria (BNE) of the above game. Specifi-
cally, we will analyze the total surplus transfered by the principal to her immediate neighbors
in BNE where all susceptible types invest in defense; that is to say, we assess the cost to the
principal of ensuring the robustness of her network through decentralized contracting.
Note that in section 1.3.3 we will discuss a variation of our framework where instead of
only being able to write contracts with her immediate neighbors in the network, the principal
can contract directly with all nodes but must pay an extra cost to contract with a node that
is not her neighbor which depends upon the node’s geodesic distance from her. We will
interpret these additional costs as communication costs, information processing costs, or
travel costs for the principal of contracting directly with someone that is not her immediate
neighbor. As noted above, an established result in the literature on contracting structures
is that, by the ‘Revelation Principal’, in the absence of such information processing and
communication costs, subcontracting structures are weakly more expensive for the principal
than centralized systems where the principal contracts with all agents directly.11 However, it
is worth noting that, for our framework, when these communication costs exist, so long as
all susceptible nodes invest in defense, a social planner that weights all agents equally will
prefer decentralized subcontracting to a centralized system where the principal pays extra
costs to contract with all agents directly. The reason is that communication costs reduce the
total surplus, where as a decentralized contracting structure just transfers surplus between
agents. We will return to this discussion in section 1.3.3.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Contracting in Line Networks
Before turning to more general network architectures, we first establish some results for
simple line networks with the principal at one end. The principal has an incentive to contract
with his immediate neighbor in order to induce her to invest in defense when susceptible
but also to induce her to write a similar contract with the next node in the line. To see how
this can be done and to establish a result on the form of the transfers that achieve this in a
BNE, we proceed inductively, starting with the simplest case of the principal and one other
node. Specifically, suppose we have two agents, p and i. To induce i to invest in defense
when susceptible, the principal must offer a contract that satisfies the relevant incentive
11See Mookherjee (2006).
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compatibility constraint, participation constraint, and the limited liability constraint for a
susceptible type. We can write these as
(1− ε)tG + εtB ≤ tG − k, (IC.1)
0 ≤ tG − k, (PC.1)
and −L ≤ tB. (LLC)
Suppose first that (LLC) does not bind. Solving for the optimal contract we get that p will
set (tG, tB) = (k, −(1−ε)
ε
k). More formally, any contract of the form (tG, tB) = (k, tB), where
tB ≤ −(1−ε)
ε
k is optimal; however, we will typically solve for the contract where the incentive
constraint binds. Note that p’s expected payoff with the contract is simply S− k, and p will
want to write this contract so long as it gives a higher expected payoff than not: specifically,
S− k > S(1− ερi).
If we alternatively suppose (LLC) is binding, then the optimal contract is given by
(tG, tB) = ( k
ε
−L,−L). Note that in this case, agent i makes a surplus of at least (1−ε)
ε
k−L.
That is to say, since punishment is limited, p must share some of the surplus with i to induce
investment in defense. The expected payoff to p is given by S− k
ε
, which is increasing in ε .
Intuitively, as we raise the probability that i is attacked, the amount of surplus p must transfer
to i for her to be sufficiently incentivized to invest in defense will fall.
Note that whether or not limited liability is binding, the principal cannot write a contract
that induces investment in defense which would be accepted by the susceptible type but reject
by the resilient type. That is to say, we only have a ‘pooling’ equilibrium, no ‘separating’
equilibrium. This is because the resilient type would always want to accept any contract that
covers the cost of investing in defense and keep this as surplus, however, the principal must
cover the cost of investing in defense for the susceptible type’s participation constraint to be
satisfied.
Next consider the simplest subcontracting case of three agents, p, i, and j, arranged in a
line with p at one end, as shown in Figure 1.1. Agent i could construct the contract exactly as
above to ensure j invests when she is susceptible. To induce i to do this and also induce her
to investing in her own defense, p can write a contract with i. Suppose again that (LLC) does
not bind in the two agent case. The relevant incentive compatibility, participation constraint,
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Figure 1.1: Three agents arranged in a line writing (sub)contracts along this line.
and limited liability constraints are then given by
tGpi −2k ≥ ρ j(1− ε)tGpi +ρ jεtBpi +(1−ρ j)tGpi − k
⇒ (tGpi − tBpi)ερ j ≥ k, (IC.2)
tGpi −2k ≥ 0, (PC.2)
and −L ≤ tBpi. (LLC)
To see that these are the relevant constraints, note that i must form a contract with j equivalent
to that in the case of two agents. The cost of forming this contract was k in the case of no
binding limited liability constraint.12











Note that the transfer in the case of no successful attack is simply twice that of before and
is just the cost of investing in defense for two nodes. The minimal sufficient punishment is
lower if 1−ρ > ερ , and larger otherwise.
For the case when limited liability constraints are binding, on the other hand, we can
12Formally, we have a second incentive compatibility constraint given by (tGpi − tBpi)(1+ρ j)ε ≥ 2k; however,
this is a looser condition for all permissible parameter values.
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In this case, the surplus p transfers to i must be more than i transfers to j.
In general, we can consider equilbiria where all susceptible nodes invest for any number
of nodes arranged in a line network with the principal at one end. The principal’s optimal
strategy in any such BNE is characterized by the proposition below.
Proposition 1.1. Suppose all agents are arranged in a line, (p,1,2, . . . , l), where l ≥ 2. In
any Bayes-Nash Equilibrium where Ii(θ s) = 1 ∀i , the principal will make a contract with
node 1 of the following form.
• When there are no binding limited liability constraints:























We show the above proposition by induction on the analysis outlined above for two
and three agents. From the first part of this result we have that for no binding limited
liability constraints, the transfer made by the principal in the good state is simply the cost of
investing in defense for all agents, lk. This should be relatively unsurprising since incentive
compatibility can always be ensured via sufficient punishment and the transfer in the good
state only needs to satisfy the participation constraint of the susceptible type, which is the
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cost of investing in defense, k.13 However, the first part of proposition 1.1 also tells us the
minimal punishment required and, therefore, when limited liability constraints will bind.
Specifically, if we suppose that the common prior belief that an agent i is susceptible
is homogeneous across i, that is ρi = ρ ∀i ∈ N, then the transfer in the bad state that is
minimally sufficient to ensure incentive compatibility is given by
tB(l) = (l − 1
ερ
)k. (1.6)
This is negative, linear, and increasing in l. Consequently the minimal punishment required
for incentive compatibility falls with the length of the line network.14 Intuitively, this is
because the probability of a disruptive shock if the agent does not take action is higher in the
larger network. This is analogous to an increase in the probability of monitoring reducing
the fine necessary for incentive compatibility. We thus have the following corollary on the
value of L such that the limited liability constraint is binding.
Corollary 1. For ρi = ρ ∀i ∈ N, the limited liability constraint will not bind when
L > (1− 1
ε
)k, if 1−ρ > ερ , and when L > (2− 1
ερ
)k, otherwise.
Intuitively, since the minimal necessary fine falls in the line length, limited liability will
not be binding so long as the constraint does not preclude the fines for line lengths of one or
two, whichever is larger.
From the second part of Proposition 1.1, on the case of a binding limited liability
constraint, we can see that the surplus transfered by the principal in the good state is greater
than simply the cost of investing for all nodes, lk. Moreover, the total amount transfered is
defined recursively, with each additional node in the line increasing the amount transfered by
roughly 1/(ε ∑lj=2 ρ j). Intuitively, this will generally cause the total surplus transfered by
the principal to increase in a convex way with the line length. Formally, we can show that the
cost to the principal is increasing and convex for the case when ρi = ρ ∀i ∈ N, L = 0, and a
weak condition on the probability of shocks being small relative to the size of the longest
path in the network holds. Specifically, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1.2. When L = 0 such that limited liability constraints are binding and ερ is
13This could be thought of analogously to how the principal will typically ‘sell the store’ to the agent in other
contracting problems without limited liability.
14tB(l) would become positive for l > 1
ερ






small, if ρi = ρ ∀i ∈ N, the cost of subcontracting to the principal is increasing and convex
in the line length.





































⇒ a− l > 0.
Note this holds in the above model since l < N −1 < N < 1
ε
< a, thus, tGl is increasing in l.









⇒ a2 + l(l +1)> 2(l +1)
⇒ (a− l)2 + l −2a > 0,
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Put differently, since punishments are constrained, to induce investment in defense the
principal must share some of the surplus in the good state with her neighbor. As the line
network gets longer the amount of surplus which must be shared increases in a convex way.
This is analogous to a double marginalization of rents problem in the industrial organization
literature. There is also an additional effect which is that, as the line network gets longer, the
probability of a disruptive shock in the case of inaction goes up and this acts to reduce the
surplus transfer required. However, this secondary effect is dominated by the first when ερ
is small relative to the path length.







Note that ε is the probability that a node is hit by a shock and ρ is the common prior belief
that a node is susceptible to shocks; therefore, ερ is the prior probability a given node will
cause a disruptive shock if it does not invest in defense. When this probability is low, it is
more costly to incentivize a neighboring node to continue the sub-contracting chain. This is
because the lower probability of a disruptive shock if the chain is not continued tightens the
incentive compatibility constraint. Intuitively, the lower the chance of a disruptive shock, the
higher the expected return to not continuing the subcontracting chain and risking a disruptive
shock. Conversely, a longer line length means a higher probability of a disruptive shock,
which loosens the incentive constraint. Therefore, ερ must be small relative to the line length
to ensure increasing and convex costs.
1.3.2 Contracting in General Acyclic Networks
So far our results on contracting have pertained to line networks where the principal is
located at one end. We now turn to more general acyclic network architectures.
When limited liability constraints are non-binding, extending the above to general archi-
tectures is relatively straightforward. In particular, when there are no constraints on liability,
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apart from covering the costs of investing in defense, no additional surplus needs to be shared
in the good state, since incentive compatibility can be ensured by a sufficient punishment in
the bad state. Specifically, we have the following result.




)k}, such that limited liability constraints
do not bind, the total transfered by p in any equilibrium where Ii(θ s) = 1 ∀i is (n−1)k.
Proof: See Appendix
Note that this means that the cost to the principal of ensuring the robustness of the network
is invariant to the network structure. Moreover, her cost is the same as were she able to
contract with every agent directly with no information processing, communication, or travel
costs; something we will discuss more in section 1.3.3. Again, this should not be surprising
given existing results on contracting structures without limited liability constraints (see
Melumad et al. (1995) or Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004)) but is a relevant benchmark.
When limited liability constraints are binding, however, the network structure becomes
important. To see this, consider the following example with five agents. Let L = 0 and
ρi = ρ ∀i ∈ N. Suppose first that the agents are arranged along a line with the principal
at one end. From Proposition 1.1, we know that to induce full investment in defense the












Now suppose that we move the final agent in the line, i4, so that she is linked to i1 instead
(as in Figure 1.2). In this case, p must write a contract with i1 that induces her to effectively
act as principal for two line networks or ‘paths’, one of length two and one of length one.15
Such a contract has two incentive constraints that we must consider: one corresponding to i1
preferring to write contracts with both paths over not; and one corresponding to preferring
writing contracts with both paths over writing a contract with only the short path.16 These
15Recall that we say there is a ‘path’ from i to j if gi j = 1 or there exists a set of distinct nodes j1, j2, . . . , jk
such that gi j1 = g j1 j2 = · · ·= g jk−1 jk = g jk j = 1. The length of a path is the number of distinct edges on that
path.
16Formally, there are further incentive constraints guaranteeing that i1 wants to invest in her own defense and
that she prefers to write contracts with both paths as oppose to only the longer path; however, these are trivially
looser constraints.
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Figure 1.2: Two possible arrangements of five agents, as described in the text.























− k ≥ 0. (PC.3)
It is straightforward to show that, when ερ is small, (IC.4) is the binding constraint and












which is cheaper than in the case where all the agents were arranged along a single line. In
fact, from Proposition 1.1 we know that this is the optimal contract for a line network of
length of three, meaning that the additional ‘leaf’ along the path has not affected the cost to
the principal.
This is due to the fact that, as established in Proposition 1.2, when ερ is small, the cost
to a principal grows in a convex way as the length of a path increases. Consequently, if an
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agent is willing to monitor a long path, they will be willing to monitor a shorter path, since
the benefit per node monitored is constant but the effective cost per node is higher in longer
paths. Thus the constraint that matters is the incentive constraint for monitoring the longest
path away from the principal. In general, we have the following result.
Proposition 1.4. When ερ is small, L = 0 and ρi = ρ ∀i ∈ N, for any two networks, g and
g′, the principal’s total surplus transfered in any BNE such that Ii(θ s) = 1 ∀i is lower in the
network that has a shorter maximal path length away from the principal.
Proof: See Appendix
Put differently, when ερ is small, the most important determinant of the principal’s cost
of ensuring network robustness is the length of the maximal path in the network originating
at the principal. This is intuitively because, when ερ is small, the convexity in the cost of
monitoring longer paths by subcontracting dominates and therefore what matters is the length
of the longest path away from the principal.
However, there is additionally a secondary effect of network structure which will affect
the total cost to the principal in networks with the same maximum path length. This is
associated with the secondary effect we noted in the case of line networks; namely that, as
the line becomes longer, the probability of a disruptive shock in the face of inaction increases,
relaxing the incentive constraint. We can think of this in terms of the ‘responsibility’ of
nodes. Specifically, we have the following definition.
Definition 1.1. The ‘responsibility’ of a node i, denoted r(i), is the number of paths between
p and all other nodes, j ∈ N, that i lies on.
This measures the number of nodes that are connected to the principal through i and
can be thought of as a betweenness centrality that only weights paths originating with the
principal. The greater the responsibility of a node, the higher the probability of a disruptive
shock if they do not carry on the subcontracting chain, for any BNE which induces all
susceptible nodes to invest otherwise. Therefore, a node with higher responsibility will
typically have a looser incentive compatibility constraint, other things equal. Furthermore,
note that the responsibility of nodes is falling along any path in the network away from
the principal and the rate at which it falls is determined by the amount of branching in
the network. In particular, as part of our proof of Proposition 1.4, we show the following
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corollary.
Corollary 2. When ερ is small, L = 0, and ρi = ρ ∀i ∈ N, for some path of maximal
length in g, in any BNE such that Ii(θ s) = 1 ∀i, the principal makes a contract with the first















r(i j) = (l −1)! (1.12)
and that any additional branching (provided the maximal path length is unchanged) acts
to increase responsibility and lower the cost to the principal. The following result follows
naturally from this observation.
Proposition 1.5. For a given maximum path length away from the principal, when ερ is
small, L = 0, and ρi = ρ ∀i ∈ N, the total surplus transfered by the principal in any BNE
such that Ii(θ s) = 1 ∀i will be weakly lower when responsibility falls more slowly along any
maximal path.
Proof: See Appendix
An interesting implication of this result is the following observation, which can be thought
of analogously to the ‘Theory of the Second Best’.
When liability is limited, the surplus given up by the principal increases in a convex way
with path lengths so shorter paths are preferred. However, if there is one longest path that
is a fixed length of at least three, when ερ is small, it is not better for the principal to have
all other path lengths be minimized. Instead, it is preferable for other nodes to be branches
towards the end of the fixed longest path such that the responsibility of nodes is maximized
along this path. Therefore, for a fixed longest path, the principal’s cost may be lower in a
network with a higher average path length.
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This stark result is illustrative of a tension between shorter distances and responsibility
in determining the cost to the principal of ensuring her networks’ robustness through sub-
contracting. We will discus this issue further in light of potential applications in section
1.4.
1.3.3 Centralized Contracting
In our base model we have focused on decentralized contracting by assuming that the
agent can only contract with her immediate neighbors. We now consider a slight variation
of this model where the principal can contract directly with all nodes. However, to contract
with a node i that is not her immediate neighbor she must pay some extra cost ci, where
ci = c(d(p, i)) and d(p, i) is the geodesic distance between the principal and node i. That is
to say, the principal must pay an extra cost that is dependent on the nodes distance away from
the principal in the network. We can think of these as communication costs, information
processing costs, or travel costs for the principal of contracting directly with someone that is
not her immediate neighbor.
Suppose first that these communication costs are zero for any distance, c(d(p, i)) = 0,
such that the principal can costlessly contract with all agents directly.17 As noted earlier, in
line with standard results in the literature, by the Revelation Principle, the principal can do
weakly better by contracting directly with all agents, in the absence of communication costs.
In particular, her cost of ensuring all agents invest when susceptible in this case would be




when it is a binding constraint. By Proposition 1.3, the principal will thus be indifferent
between centralized and decentralized contracting when liability is not bindingly limited
and there are no communication costs. However, when there are communication costs and
limited liability is not binding, she will prefer decentralized subcontracting, since this avoids
the extra communication costs without affecting the surplus transfered to other nodes.
When limited liability is binding and there are no communication costs, the principal
does strictly better contracting with all agents directly for any network that has distances
17Note that this setting is equivilent to a mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful revelation of types
in an incentive compatible way.
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from the principal greater than one; that is, any network that is not a ‘star’ network organized
around the principal —which is trivially equivalent to contracting directly with all nodes.
When limited liability is binding and there are communication costs, the principal’s
strategy in a BNE where all susceptible types invest in defense will depend upon the function
c(d(p, i)). That is to say, how communication costs change with distances in the network. If
communication costs increase with distance, as seems most natural, of importance will be
whether they increase in a concave, linear, or convex manner. For instance, if communication
costs increase in a linear or concave manner, since the cost of subcontracting along a path is
increasing and convex in the length of that path, there will be some distance along that path
for which it becomes an optimal strategy for the principal to contract with agents directly.
Formally, we have the following result.
Proposition 1.6. When ερ is small, L = 0, ρi = ρ ∀i ∈ N, c′ > 0, and c′′ ≤ 0, for a maximal
path away from the principal of length l, there exists an l̄ such that for l ≥ l̄ it is preferable
for p to contract directly with some agents.
Proof: See Appendix
The above result implies that, under binding limited liability constraints, the principal
will typically prefer to contract directly with at least some agents in networks with long paths
and communication costs that do not increase quickly with distance. However, from the
perspective of a social planner that weights the utility of all nodes equally, this is inefficient.
The reason is that subcontracting to ensure robustness of the network exhibits no dead weight
loss, however, the principal does not internalize the utility of other nodes so takes all surplus
transfered as a loss. Direct contracting, on the other hand, reduces total surplus through
communication and information processing costs.
1.4 Applications and Discussion
We turn now to two potential applications of the model. The first is a producer concerned
with the robustness of its supply chain to natural disasters and the second is a firm owner
monitoring adherence to a safety regulation by her employees.18
18Possible applications not developed here include the head of an organization ensuring its digital networks
are robust to cybersecurity threats; a bank ensuring its local financial network is insulated from contagious
default; or the head of a criminal organization concerned about police investigation and attempts to dismantle
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1.4.1 Supply Chain Robustness:
Suppose that we have some final goods producer whose output is dependent upon their
supply chain. That is to say, we have some principal, p, who produces a consumer good
and receives some positive surplus, S, from meeting demand. To produce the final good, she
purchases an intermediate good from her supplier who in turn uses an intermediate good in
production, purchased from their supplier, and so on, for a supply chain of length l.
Suppose that there is some threat of natural disasters facing the firms in the supply chain.
If they are affected by a disaster they are unable to meet demand and the final good producer
will in turn be unable to meet demand and so lose her surplus. Intermediate producers in the
supply chain may be susceptible to natural disasters or not and this is private information.
Firms may invest in contingencies that allow them to meet demand in the event of a natural
disaster, such as a back stock of product, or infrastructure investments to reduce the impact of
disasters. However, free entry in intermediate goods markets means that firms in p’s supply
chain make zero profit and have no incentive to invest in such contingencies. Moreover,
investment in these contingencies cannot be credibly verified.
In this setting, the final good producer has an incentive to write contracts that ensure
any vulnerable suppliers in their supply chain invest in contingencies. Assuming she can
only write contracts with her immediate supplier, this is achieved through a subcontracting
structure, as described above.
From our results in Section 1.3.1, we would expect that p’s cost of ensuring her supply
chain’s robustness will depend upon whether firms face a limited liability constraint in
writing contracts with their suppliers. If they do not then her costs will be proportional to the
length of her supply chain. In reality, it is unlikely that firms are able to take on unlimited
liability. Specifically, although under-delivery penalty contracts may be accepted when
disruptions arise endogenously (say from negligence or poor quality control), buyers are
generally unlikely to penalize suppliers after exogenous disruptions such as natural disasters.
This may be due to a credibility problem with such punishments; once a disaster occurs,
it is in the final good producer’s interest to help its suppliers get up and running again as
soon as possible. Ang et al. (2016) note that Toyota did exactly this after the 2011 Tōhoku
earthquake. With these limits to liability, the cost of inducing investment by subcontracting
will increase in a convex way with the length of the supply chain.
their network.
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However, by Proposition 1.5, although longer supply chains are more costly to protect
in a decentralized way, it does not follow that ‘wider’ or ‘more complex’ supply chains are
necessarily more expensive to monitor and, in fact, could actually be cheaper. In particular, if
we made the supply chain more complex in the sense of firms requiring multiple intermediate
inputs for some stages of production, provided the longest path away from the principal is
unchanged, this additional branching could reduce the cost of monitoring to the principal by
increasing responsibility along the supply chain, loosening incentive constraints.
Finally, by Proposition 1.6, if the final good producer is in fact able to contract directly
with all firms in her supply chain but subject to communication/travel costs that increase in
network distance (in a linear or concave way), we would expect that she would do so for
at least some firms when the length of the supply chain increases. However, from a social
planner’s perspective that weights all nodes’ utilities equally, the incursion of these added
communication costs will be inefficient relative to subcontracting.
1.4.2 Employee Adherence to Safety Regulations in a Firm:
Suppose there exists an owner and a set of employees arranged in a firm network. We
will think of this as a tree network for simplicity. The owner, p, will receive a fine if one of
her workers is found in violation of some safety code or regulation. External inspections
occur randomly and a worker in violation can pay some cost, k, to be brought up to code.
The employees have no ex-ante incentive to ensure they comply to the regulation and so the
owner must align incentives through contracting.
Delegating through subcontracting, as described above, will transfer surplus down the
management hierarchy, from the owner to managers to employees, but leave total welfare
unchanged. When there are no binding limited liability constraints, the total surplus that must
be transfered by the owner is invariant to the firm’s management structure. However, except
in a setting such as a criminal organization, we would expect strong limits to the liability
parties can take on.
Under binding limited liability constraints, the firm’s structure will affect the cost to the
principal of inducing employees in violation to bring themselves up to code. In particular,
the cost will be increasing and convex in the length of paths away from the principal. That is
to say, the ‘depth’ of the organizational/management hierarchy. This increasing and convex
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Figure 1.3: Moving employee i under the management of j, may reduce the total cost to p of
decentralized monitoring, despite reducing p’s centrality
cost in the depth of management hierarchy means that shorter hierarchies, with less levels of
management are preferable for the owner in terms of ensuring adherence to this regulation.
However, the optimal management hierarchy depth may be fixed for some other reason,
exogenous to our model. By proposition 1.5, with a fixed longest path away from the owner
of length greater than three, it is not necessarily true that it is preferable to have a lower
number of steps between the owner and all other nodes that are not on this path. To see this,
suppose that the firm’s network has some fixed longest path in the management hierarchy
and that p additionally interacts with some employee i directly. If instead of interacting
with i directly, i was under the management of some node j on the longest path, this would
increase the responsibility of some nodes along the longest path. This would loosen incentive
constraints and reduce the overall cost to the owner of ensuring safety compliance of her firm,
despite a reduction in her centrality. An example is depicted in Figure 1.3. In summary, where
part of a firm requires some fixed management structure, it may be optimal for the owner to
incorporate all other employees within this structure, in order to maximize responsibility and
loosen incentive constraints.
Finally, if the owner can contract directly with all her employees this would be weakly
better for her, in the absence of information processing costs. Typically, however, one would
expect that the owner dealing directly with all employees would in fact incur additional
information processing or communication costs. Generally, it may still be preferable for the
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owner to contract directly with all her employees, rather than delegating; however, this will
be socially inefficient, in the sense of a reduction in total surplus.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a new approach to the problem of network security that
focuses on the capacity for incentives for network defense to be aligned across a network
when agents can only write contracts with their immediate neighbors. We presented a
tractable model that allows preliminary analysis into the effects of network architecture
on contracting for general acyclic networks. In line with existing work in the industrial
organization and mechanism design literature, we found that network architecture is moot
in the absence of constraints to limited liability. When liability is limited, however, we find
that the cost to the principal—the agent in the network that uniquely derives a surplus from
it going undisrupted—of ensuring her network’s robustness is increasing and convex in the
number of steps of subcontracting required. Specifically, we found that, when the probability
of a shock is low, of first importance is the length of the longest subcontracting chain. The
next most important feature of the network is the ‘responsibility’ of nodes along this longest
path, which is based on the rate of branching in the network. An implication of this is that
for networks where some nodes are at a fixed distance away from the principal of at least
three, the cost to the principal is not necessarily lower if all other nodes have a minimal
distance, since this may reduce responsibility along the longest subcontracting chain. We
then extended our model to allow the principal to contract with all nodes directly but at some
additional information processing, communication, or travel cost. We found that, depending
on how these costs change with distances in the network, the principal will often prefer to
contract directly with other nodes in larger networks; however, this is socially inefficient in
the sense that it reduces total surplus.
It should be noted that we have assumed that the network structure is common knowledge.
In some applications, such as an owner and their firm’s management structure, this may
be plausible. However, in other settings, such as supply networks, it is well documented
that agents typically have limited network information. An interesting avenue for further
work could therefore consider an agent’s capacity to elicit both whether their neighbors
are susceptible to disruptive shocks and their network connections. Note that in some
settings, such as contagious shocks, their susceptibility may be dependent on their network
connections.
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Our results offer some very preliminary insights into contracting in general networks
and the implications of contracting in networks for optimal network design. Our model is
suggestive of a trade-off between network architectures that generate a high surplus and
the capacity to align incentives across agents in these networks. A richer framework that
explicitly models network value might give greater insight into this problem.
Appendix 1.A
1.A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Consider first the case of no limited liability constraint. We can show by induction that the





ρi ≥ (l −1)k (IC.5)
tG − lk ≥ 0 (PC.4)
To do this, take the relevant constraints given in the text for l = 2 as a basis, and assume the
above form. Trivially, this will imply that for a path length l we have tG = lk. Thus, when the
path length is l +1 we have that the relevant (i.e. binding) incentive compatibility constraint
is give by














and the participation constraint is
tG − lk− k ≥ 0 ⇒ tG − (l +1)k.
Thus we have shown that the above are the relevant constraints for a path length of l by
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Note that formally this is the maximal value of tB for which the IC constraint is satisfied, any
value less than this would suffice for an optimal contract. However, by (1.16) we can see
when the limited liability constraint will bind.
Now consider the case of binding limited liability constraints. By definition, we will have
tB = −L for any path length. Therefore, the binding incentive compatibility constraint to



















Thus, noting (1.5) above, we have inductively defined the optimal contract for all path
lengths.
1.A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.3
The network g is minimally connected by assumption, also known as a ‘tree’. Note that if it
contained cycles then we could consider a tree g′ which is found by removing links from
g one at a time in a way that preserves connectivity of the network. While g′ may not be
unique depending on the order links are removed, the following logic is invariant to this.
Since Ii(θ s) = 1 ∀i, it must be that the principal induces her neighbors to both invest
in defense and in turn act as a (sub)principal on the remaining part of the tree to which
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she is linked not through the principal. Her incentive compatibility constraint to do so can
be satisfied trivially for a sufficiently negative transfer in the bad state, tB. Furthermore,
since Ii(θ s) = 1 ∀i, the bad state has a zero probability and so the participation constraint is
independent of tB. This argument iterates until we reach the ‘leaves’ of the tree, i.e. nodes
with a degree of one. The participation constraint for all leaves will be satisfied so long as
tG ≥ k. In turn, the participation constraint of a node that must induce m leaves to contribute
is satisfied so long as tG ≥ (m+1)k. Iterating back towards the principal, it is clear that the
sum of transfers she makes to her neighbors in the good state must be (n−1)k; the cost of
investing for all nodes, minus the principal herself.
1.A.3 Proof of Proposition 1.4
Suppose that in some network the maximal path length is l and index all agents on one path
of length l by p, i1, i2, ..., il−1, il . To induce il to invest when susceptible, il−1 must offer a
contract of the form ( k
ε
,0). For il−1 to induce il−1 to do this, she must in turn write a contract







This binds over the participation constraint, whatever other links il−1 may have, so long as
ερ is small.
To induce il−2 to write this contract, il−3 must in turn offer her a contract. When ερ is













where r(il−1) is the responsibility of il−1 (see definition 1.1). Again, this will bind over the
participation constraint for any other links il−2 may have, when ερ is small.
Iterating backwards we have that the binding incentive constraint for il− j’s problem, for
3 ≤ j ≤ l −1, is given by
tGil− jil−( j−1) − t
G




tGil− jil−( j−1) (1.21)
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r(i j)≥ (l −1)! (1.24)
and is bounded above by some R̄, due to the fact that g is finite.
Now suppose we have two maximal path lengths l and l′, such that l′ > l. The total














where f is some finite number indicating the number of paths of length l in g. For sufficiently
small ερ , we thus have that
T S(l′)> T S(l). (1.27)
1.A.4 Proof of Proposition 1.5
Take some path of maximal length, l, away from the principal and index the nodes along













By definition, it must be that r(i j)> r(i j′) for j < j′. Let
∆r = r(i j)− r(i j−1)≤−1 (1.28)





r(i2)(r(i2)+∆r)(r(i2)+2∆r) . . .(r(i2)+(l −2)∆r)(ερ)l−1
, (1.29)
which is a decreasing function of ∆r, for ∆r ≤−1.
1.A.5 Proof of Proposition 1.6
By (1.28), we have a lower bound on the total surplus transfered by the principal for a







This is increasing and convex in l. An upper bound on the total cost to the principal of
contracting directly with all nodes connected to the principal via this maximal path (i.e.
























Demand-Led Innovation in Supply
Chains1
2.1 Introduction
There is much interest in the research and development (R&D) carried out by firms as
a source of long-term technological growth in economies. In light of this, attention has
been given to the incentives for firms to undertake R&D and, in particular, it has been noted
that an increase in the size of a firm’s market can induce greater investment in innovation.2
We argue that it is important to any such story to consider the general equilibrium effects
and, specifically, the role of supply chains and input markets. For example, suppose the US
government awards a federal procurement contract to a firm in a particular state. This boost in
demand will increase the firm’s incentive to undertake R&D. However, additionally we should
consider the impact on the firm’s suppliers through an increase in derived demand. These
upstream input producers may also increase R&D, amplifying the increase in innovation. On
the other hand, the increase in derived demand may push up the price of inputs affecting
downstream firms in other states, reducing their level of R&D.
Given the development of empirical studies addressing demand-led innovation in supply
chains, it is vital to have a theoretical framework as a foundation to such analysis. We
1Analysis of a special case of the model presented in this essay was originally commissioned by Dr. Vasco
Carvalho and forms a theoretical appendix of Draca and Carvalho (2017).
2The first work to champion demand-led innovation was the seminal study by Schmookler (1962) on
technological change.
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therefore develop a model of demand-led innovation in supply chains. We consider a finite
set of firms each producing either a distinct primary input or a final good. Final good
producers use the primary inputs for production and each sell to a distinct local market. Firms
may invest in R&D to reduce their marginal cost of production. The model has three stages:
first, all firms choose a level of expenditure on R&D; next, input producers set prices; and
lastly, final good producers set output.
We start by considering special cases where there is only one final good producer. These
settings can equivalently be thought of as the case where no final good producers share
common suppliers. We show that the marginal response of R&D expenditure in all firms to
a positive demand shock is positive. This is because the positive demand shock cascades
up the supply chain without pecuniary feedback on other final good producers. We then
consider the general setting where there are multiple final good producers sharing common
input suppliers. In this more general setting, although we can still show there exists a unique
equilibrium, we can no longer sign the comparative statics unambiguously. This is because
of pecuniary externalities that arise between final good producers. We show that the result
of increased R&D in all firms following a positive demand shock found with no common
suppliers does not hold in general and that some final good producers may decrease R&D
expenditure following a positive shock to another market, due to pecuniary externalities.
We discuss situations when the effect of the demand shock on input prices might be offset
by increased innovation amongst primary good producers. Our results show that while a
positive demand shock in a final goods market can have further positive effects on innovation
in upstream markets, pecuniary externalities that feedback down to other final goods markets
can offset this. Therefore, it is important to account for these supply chain effects when
assessing the impact of demand changes on innovation.
A special case of the model presented here is utilized in the empirical study by Draca and
Carvalho (2017) on the upstream response of innovation to demand shocks for final goods.
Specifically, they use data on military procurement contracts and patent data for the US to
estimate upstream effects on R&D from boosts in demand caused by changes in military
spending. They consider the version of our model restricted to one final good and one primary
good in order to establish a theoretical prediction of positive innovation responses cascading
up supply chains and find evidence of this effect. Our work here complements their study
by building a broader theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of demand shocks on
innovation in supply chains. In particular, our findings offer additional theoretical predictions
for the innovation response in other final good markets that share common suppliers.
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This work is also part of an older literature on market characteristics and innovation; see
Cohen (2010) for a comprehensive survey. This literature studies, from both a theoretical
and empirical perspective, the impact of market features such as demand, demand elasticity,
competition, and market structure on innovation. Among this work, studies such as Stoneman
(1979), Scherer (1982) and Geroski and Walters (1995) find evidence that increased demand
can spur innovation, however, these studies also find the variation in innovation explained
by demand alone is relatively low. More recent work by Acemoglu and Linn (2004) studies
the effect of an aging population on R&D in pharmaceuticals and finds robust evidence that
increased market size has had a large effect on the entry of new drugs and pharmaceutical
innovation. Slavtchev and Wiederhold (2016) use data on federal procurement in US states
and find evidence that variation in government demand has a large effect on private R&D.
Our work contributes to this literature by studying the theoretical effects of demand, supply
chains, and the interaction of the two on the incentives for firms to innovate.
Our work is also related to a large literature on cooperative and competitive R&D by
related firms; see D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992), Ishii (2004).
This work utilizes similarly structured games, typically with one or two goods, and focuses
on optimal merger decisions by the firms. In contrast to this work, we focus on the impact
of positive demand shocks on innovation up and across supply chains and do not consider
research joint ventures.3 A key feature of their work is also the inclusion of non-pecuniary
spillovers from R&D expenditure, also known as ‘pure-knowledge’ spillovers. The intuition
for such spillovers is that related firms naturally benefit from each other’s innovation when
ideas and techniques are transferable. These spillovers create externalities that drive an
incentive for mergers. Evidence on the role of these knowledge spillovers is provided by
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). We do not incorporate such externalities in our basic
model but discuss them further in section 2.4. Bimpikis et al. (2014) study a model where
firms compete à la Cournot, producing a homogeneous product that they can sell to several
different markets. Which markets a firm can sell to is determined by an exogenous bilateral
network. They study firms’ optimal production decisions and the impact of changes in the
competition structure, as determined by the network. They do not consider innovation or
networks of suppliers.
The primary contribution of this paper is the formation of a model of demand-led
innovation in supply chains and the derivation of a unique equilibrium for comparative static
3Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) study R&D cooperation as a network formation game and find that
firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links.
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analysis that provides theoretical predictions on innovation responses of both upstream firms
and other final good producers that are useful for empirical analysis.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the basic model.
Section 2.3.1 analyses two special cases with n = 1. Section 2.3.2 analyses the general case
comparing with the special cases. Section 2.4 provides discussion of extensions to the basic
model and areas for further work. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
There is a finite set N = {1, . . . ,n+m} of firms. Each firm is either a final good producer
or a primary input producer. We will typically index the final good producers by i = 1, . . . ,n
and the primary producers by j = n+ 1, . . . ,n+m. That is to say, we have n final good
producers and m primary good producers. Primary good producers each produce a unique
input to production that they sell to final good producers. Final good producers require 1m
units of each primary good to produce one unit of output.
Final good firm i faces a linear inverse demand function:
Pi(X) = ai −Xi, (2.1)
where ai > 0 and Xi is output of firm i. A more general demand function would not substan-
tially effect the qualitative results presented here and this formulation is largely for clarity of
exposition, however, we will discuss the role of demand elasticity in section 2.4. We will
generally assume that a1, . . . ,an are large enough that outputs represent interior solutions.
Note that final good firms each face an individual inverse demand function and are not in
competition with each other. This may be interpreted as each final good producer selling to
their own distinct local market. We abstract from competition effects in this way because
we want to focus on the impact of demand shocks on innovation and how these propagate
through the supply chain and across markets through common suppliers. The impact of
competition on innovation has been widely studied elsewhere, see Aghion et al. (2005). We
will discuss extension of our framework to allow for competition amongst firms in section
2.4.
Both primary and final good producers may invest in R&D. Doing so reduces their
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Figure 2.1: Each final good producer requires 1m units of each input to produce one unit of
output.








where Pj is the price of primary good j and Ei is R&D expenditure by firm i. The latter
term is the total input cost to one unit of output, while c(Ei) is the firm’s internal processing
cost per unit which depends upon their R&D expenditure. Specifically, we will assume the
following constraints on the function c(·):
Assumption 2.1. c(·)> 0 is a continuous and twice differentiable function such that c′(·)< 0,
c′′(·)> 0.
That is to say, costs are positive, decreasing, and convex in R&D expenditure. This corre-
sponds to diminishing marginal returns to R&D expenditure. The marginal cost for primary
good firm j, since they have no inputs to production, is simply
C j = c(E j) (2.3)
and total profit for both primary and final good firms is
Πi = Xi(Pi −Ci)−Ei. (2.4)
The model has three stages. In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose R&D ex-
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penditures. In the second stage, primary good producing firms simultaneously set prices to
maximize profit. In the final stage, final good producing firms simultaneously set output to
maximize profit. Note that whether firms set output or prices in stages two and three, this is
equivalent. We solve for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium by backward induction.
Note that we assume that R&D investments are common knowledge in stages two and
three. In reality firms may not observe the research expenditures (or equivalently the marginal
costs in our setting) of other firms.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Special Cases
Before considering our model with n and m general, we will first consider the special
cases of our model given by n = m = 1, and n = 1, m ≥ 1. For these cases that have the
feature of no common input suppliers we will be able to show that a positive demand shock
to the final good producer will increase R&D expenditure in all firms. Intuitively, the shock
will translate up the supply chain through derived demand. We will subsequently consider
the general setting with common input suppliers where, although we can show there exists
a unique equilibrium, we can no longer sign the comparative statics. We show that some
final good producers may decrease R&D expenditure following a positive shock to another
market, due to pecuniary externalities.
Case 1: n = m = 1
First, assume that we have the simplest case of n = m = 1; that is to say, one final good
firm (Firm 1), and one primary good firm (Firm 2). To solve for a sub-game perfect Nash








The corresponding first order condition is
P1(X1)−C1 −X1 = 0








Furthermore, since one unit of the final good requires one unit of the input, in equilibrium




















which we can rewrite as





a1 − c(E1)+ c(E2)
)
. (2.7)
Substituting (2.7) back into the demand functions (2.6) and (2.1), we have that output is
given by




a1 − c(E1)− c(E2)
)
, (2.8)





3a1 + c(E1)+ c(E2)
)
. (2.9)
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Moreover, substituting back into (2.4), we have that profits for Firm 1 and Firm 2 respectively
are
Π1 = X12 −E1 (2.10)
Π2 = 2X22 −E2. (2.11)
As noted above, we will assume that a1 is large enough that (2.7) to (2.11) represent interior
solutions. These equations are intuitively standard monopoly output, pricing, and profits,
with price increasing in demand and marginal cost while output is increasing in demand and
falling in marginal cost.
We can now consider the first stage R&D decisions of the two firms. Firm 1 and Firm 2’s


















X1c′(Ei)−1 = 0 (2.12)





⇒−X2c′(E2)−1 = 0 (2.13)
for the primary good firm.
For illustration, before considering all marginal cost functions c(·) satisfying Assumption
2.1, let us suppose c(Ei) = e−Ei . That is to say, assume the simplest specific functional form
for c(·) satisfying Assumption 2.1. By assuming a specific functional form we will be able
to solve this simplest possible case analytically. We will subsequently show that our results
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hold for any cost function satisfying Assumption 2.1.
When c(Ei) = e−Ei , (2.12) and (2.13) become
(a1 − e−E1 − e−E2)e−E1 = 8,
(a1 − e−E1 − e−E2)e−E2 = 4,
where the former is the condition for Firm 1 and the latter for Firm 2. For ease of exposition,
we will let e−E1 = c1 and e−E2 = c2, such that our conditions are








Substituting the latter condition for c1 we can solve for c∗2:








2 −a1c∗2 +4 = 0












Two things can be noted about these solutions. One is that a real valued solution existing
requires a1 to be sufficiently large; specifically it must be that a1 ≥
√
48. Intuitively, if a1 is
too small, demand is not sufficient for firms to want to operate. Secondly we can note that
the first of these solutions is invalid as it implies a negative level of R&D expenditure and
corresponds to a minimum.











which is negative and converging to zero in a1. Since c∗2 = e
−E∗2 and using (2.13), we can
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That is to say, an increase in the market size for the final good will increase equilibrium R&D
expenditure by both the downstream firm and the upstream firm. Intuitively, the increased
market size for the downstream firm raises there incentive to undertake R&D to lower costs
and increase output, as in Schmookler (1962). Here we see that this market size effect will
also translate up the supply chain to the input producer due to increased derived demand.
The input producer thus also raises R&D expenditure.
This result that both firms will increase innovation in response to a positive demand
shock can also be shown for any function c(·) satisfying Assumption 2.1. To do this, we first
show that there exists a unique equilibrium to the game by the sufficient condition derived by
Rosen (1965). For this we will use the Jacobian of marginal profits (equivalently the Hessian
of profits) with respect to research expenditures. We will denote this matrix as J(E) and we
summarize its elements below:






























From equations (2.15) to (2.18) we can see that only the diagonal elements of J(E)
depend upon market size, a1, through outputs, X1 = X2. From Assumption 2.1 we have that
c(·)> 0, c′(·)< 0, and c′′(·)> 0; therefore, by inspection, for large enough a1 both diagonal
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elements are negative and, moreover, J(E) has a dominant diagonal. Specifically, we say that
a matrix M has a dominant diagonal if |mii| > ∑ j ̸=i |mi j|, for all i. By Namatame and Tse
(1981), it follows that J(E)+ JT (E) is negative definite. Therefore, by Rosen (1965), profit
functions are diagonally strictly concave and there exists a unique equilibrium.
Note that for a general cost function satisfying Assumption 2.1 we cannot derive a specific
lower bound above which a1 is sufficiently large, however, by equations (2.15) to (2.18)
and Assumption 2.1 it follows that there must exist some ā such that for a1 > ā, J(E) has
a unique solution by Rosen (1965). The value of ā will depend upon the function c(·); in
the case of c(Ei) = e−Ei , we found above that ā =
√
48. Intuitively, if the market size is
too small, for a particular cost function firms may not make positive profit and as such no
equilibrium will exist.
With a unique equilibrium for the game, we can use the ‘Implicit Function Theorem’ to
derive the sign of the effect of an increase in market size on innovation.
Lemma 2.1. When n = m = 1 and a1 is sufficiently large, ∂Ei∂a1 > 0, for i = 1,2.
Proof: See appendix
This result is shown by differentiating conditions (2.12) and (2.13) implicitly giving two
equations in two unknowns that are signed by Cramer’s rule. As above, for a general cost
function we cannot derive a specific lower bound on a1 as such a bound would depend upon
the specific cost function, however, the result holds for a1 > ā for some ā. We showed above
that for the simplest case of c(Ei) = e−Ei , a1 >
√
48 is sufficient for increased innovation in
both firms following a positive demand shock.
Case 2: n = 1, m ≥ 1
We now consider the case of any number, m, of input producers but only one final good
producer to see if the result that all firms will increase innovation in response to a positive
shock to demand for the final good still holds. This can be thought of as the case where
no final good producer shares common suppliers with the final good firm that receives the
demand shock. It turns out that the result does still hold in this case and the analysis is very
similar, except that derived demand for inputs is now 1mX1. Intuitively, we will still have that
the demand shock translates up the supply chain through derived demand for inputs.
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Specifically, utilizing the same backward induction argument as above, in the third stage















Since X j = 1mX1 for j = 2, . . . ,m+1, substituting into (2.19) we have that derived demand














where P is the vector of all input prices (P2, . . . ,Pm+1).
Using (2.20) we can then solve the primary good firms’ profit maximization problem in




[Pj −C j]X j(P)−E j
}
,
taking Pk as given for all k ̸= j. The corresponding first order condition is then














Since this holds for j = 2, . . . ,m+1, we have a system of m linear equations in m unknowns.












for j = 2, . . . ,m+ 1. Substituting (2.22) back into (2.19), (2.20) and (2.1), we have that



























Furthermore, profits for Firm 1 are still
Π1 = X12 −E1 (2.25)
and for primary good firms, j = 2, . . . ,m+1,
Π j = 2m2X j2 −E j. (2.26)
As for n = m = 1, Equations (2.22) to (2.26) represent standard monopoly output, pricing,
and profits, with price increasing in demand and marginal cost while output is increasing in
demand and falling in marginal cost. An increase in the number of inputs lowers X1 and thus








We can now turn to the profit maximizing R&D decision in the first stage, as in the case










c′(E1)−1 = 0, (2.27)







X jc′(E j)−1 = 0. (2.28)
These first order conditions are a system of m+1 non-linear equations for which a solution
coincides with a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. Since we now have m+1
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non linear equations, unlike the case of n = m = 1 we will not be able to solve analytically,
even in the simplest case of c(Ei) = e−Ei . However, we will still be able to show there exists
a unique equilibrium and show that all firms increase R&D following a positive demand
shock to the final good market by building on our method above for n = m = 1 using the
sufficient condition of Rosen (1965). For this we will again use the Jacobian of marginal
profits with respect to research expenditures. We will denote this matrix as J(E) and we
summarize its elements below:

















































As before, from (2.29) to (2.33) we can see that only the diagonal elements of J(E)
depend upon market size, a1, through outputs. Therefore, just as in the case of n = m = 1,
for large enough a1 all diagonal elements are negative and, moreover, J(E) has a dominant
diagonal. Thus, by Namatame and Tse (1981), it follows that J(E)+ JT (E) is negative
definite. Therefore, by Rosen (1965), profit functions are diagonally strictly concave and
there exists a unique equilibrium. As above, for a general cost function satisfying Assumption
2.1 we cannot derive a specific lower bound above which a1 is sufficiently large.
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With a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, we can again differentiate implicitly to
determine the comparative statics.
Proposition 2.1. When n = 1 and a1 is sufficiently large, ∂Ei∂a1 > 0, for all i ∈ N, for any
m ≥ 1.
Proof: See appendix
This result implies that all innovation responses are positive when there are no other
final good firms that share common suppliers with the firm who’s market receives a positive
demand shock. The result is proved inductively using Lemma 2.1 as a basis step then showing
that an additional input producer leaves the qualitative comparative statics unchanged for
any m. Intuitively, the demand shock to the final good market increases the final good firm’s
optimal level of R&D expenditure and output. The increased output of the final good firm
increases derived demand for all input producers who in turn increase R&D expenditure.
2.3.2 General Case
We now consider the general case with commonality in input suppliers. In this more
general setting, although we can show there exists a unique equilibrium, we can no longer
sign the comparative statics. This is because of pecuniary externalities that arise between final
good producers. We show that some final good producers may decrease R&D expenditure
following a positive shock to another market, due to pecuniary externalities. As before we
proceed by backward induction.
Third Stage:
To solve for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, consider first final good firm i’s profit
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The corresponding first order condition is
Pi(Xi)−Ci −Xi = 0










































where P is the vector of all input prices (Pn+1, . . . ,Pn+m).
Second Stage:





[Pj −C j]X j(P)−E j
}
,
taking Pk as given for all k ̸= j. The corresponding first order condition is then



















Since this holds for j = n+ 1, . . . ,n+m, we have a system of m linear equations in m
unknowns. We can solve this system straightforwardly in matrix notation and demonstrate
this in the appendix. Doing so yields the following result.
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for j = n+1, . . . ,n+m.
Proof: See appendix.
Substituting (2.37) back into the demand functions, (2.34) and (2.35), we have that







































Furthermore, profits for final good firms, i = 1, . . . ,n, are
Πi = Xi2 −Ei (2.40)




X j2 −E j. (2.41)
Note, as mentioned above, we will generally assume that a1, . . . ,an are large enough that
outputs represent interior solutions. Equations (2.37) to (2.41) are generalizations of the
standard monopoly pricing, output and profits found in the special cases above with price
increasing in demand and marginal cost while output is increasing in demand and falling in
marginal cost. Primary good firm j’s output is increasing in the number of final good firms,
n, due to greater demand. Final good firm i’s output is intuitively falling in n due to greater
demand pushing up input prices.
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First Stage:



















c′(Ei)−1 = 0. (2.42)









X jc′(E j)−1 = 0. (2.43)
These first order conditions are a system of n+m non-linear equations for which a
solution coincides with a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. As with the special
case n = 1, m ≥ 1, this system cannot be solved analytically even for the simplest case of
c(Ei) = e−Ei . To show that there exists a unique equilibrium to the game, we will use the
Jacobian of marginal profits (equivalently the Hessian of profits) with respect to research
expenditures. We will denote this matrix as J(E) and we summarize its elements below:












































































We can now show that there will exist a unique solution whenever market sizes are not
too small.
Proposition 2.2. For sufficiently large market sizes, a1, . . . ,an, there exists a unique sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof: From equations (2.44) to (2.49) we can see that only the diagonal elements of J(E)
depend upon outputs and therefore market sizes, a1, . . . ,an. It is straightforward to check
that for large enough a1, . . . ,an all diagonal elements are negative and, moreover, J(E)
has a dominant diagonal. Specifically, we say that a matrix M has a dominant diagonal if
|mii| > ∑ j ̸=i |mi j|, for all i. By Namatame and Tse (1981), it follows that J(E)+ JT (E) is
negative definite. Therefore, by Rosen (1965), profit functions are diagonally strictly concave
and there exists a unique equilibrium.
As discussed above, the requirement that market sizes are sufficiently large ensures
interior solutions but we cannot derive a specific lower bound for a general cost function
satisfying Assumption 2.1.
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Comparative Statics:
Since we have a unique equilibrium for the game, we can use the ‘Implicit Function
Theorem’ to derive comparative statics. In particular, we can look at the response of R&D
expenditure in all firms to a demand shock in some final goods market.
For all firms j ∈ N, the corresponding first order condition for profit maximization with
respect to R&D expenditure can be written
F(E,a) = X j(E,a)c′(E j)−A j = 0,
for some constant A j. Differentiating implicitly with respect to the market size of final good
































where M is the n+m by n+m matrix
− ∂X1
∂E1
c′(E1)−X1c′′(E1) − ∂X1∂E2 c
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c′(En+m) − ∂Xn+m∂E2 c
′(En+m) · · · − ∂Xn+m∂En+m c
′(En+m)−Xn+mc′′(En+m)
 .


















However, unlike in the special cases with n = 1 such that there is no commonality in
suppliers, we cannot unambiguously sign the R&D expenditure response to a positive demand
shock in market s. The reason for this is that there is now a pecuniary externality between
final good producers. That is to say, we will not only have a positive demand shock cascading
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Figure 2.2: Two final goods firms that each require one unit of firm 3’s output to produce one
unit, as discussed in Example 1.
up the network but also price effects feeding back down the network to the other final good
producers. To see this, consider the following simple counter example showing that it is no
longer the case that a positive demand shock will increase R&D expenditure in all firms.
Example 1. Suppose we have three firms: two final good producers and one producer of
an input, as shown in Figure 2.2. Both final good producers require one unit of the input
to produce one unit of output. Further suppose c(Ei) = e−Ei and initially a1 = a2 = 20. In
equilibrium we will therefore have E1 ≈ 1.30,E2 ≈ 1.30,E3 ≈ 0.89. If we then increase a1
to 30, R&D expenditures become E1 ≈ 1.88,E2 ≈ 0.99,E3 ≈ 1.12. Here we see that, while
both firms one and three increase the R&D expenditure following the shock, the increased
price of the input causes the other final good producer to reduce innovation and output.
So far we have shown that the impact of an increase in final demand for one good will
have a positive effect on R&D for all firms if no final good producers share common suppliers
with the market that received the positive shock (i.e. n = 1); however, when there exist other
final good producers with common suppliers, their innovation expenditure may fall. This
can occur because the demand shock may increase the price of their common inputs and
this increased input price reduces the incentive for R&D. However, we might ask if it is
necessarily the case that primary good prices will rise.
To see this, note that the price of inputs change in response to a positive demand shock
for two reasons: the direct effect of increased derived demand, pushing up prices; and the
increase in R&D expenditure lowering costs, reducing prices. The strength of the pecuniary
externality and whether it is positive or negative will therefore depend upon the curvature of
the function, c(E). We can demonstrate this by considering a single firm choosing an optimal
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level of output and R&D expenditure while facing a linear demand schedule.4 In this case,
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⇒ F(a,E∗) =(a− c(E∗))c′(E∗)+2 = 0. (2.52)






















This is the change in price in response to an increase in demand and is negative when
innovation offsets the direct effect of increased demand. We can derive a condition on the
curvature of the cost function for when (2.54) will be negative. To do this, first note that
(2.53) is positive since the second order necessary condition for maximizing profit with








⇒ (a− c(E∗))c′′(E∗)− c′(E∗)2 ≥ 0. (2.55)
From (2.55), since c′(·)< 0, we can immediately see that (2.53) must be positive. Expanding




⇒ 2c′(E∗)2 > (a− c(E∗))c′′(E∗),
4The elasticity of final demand would also influence the pecuniary externality. We discuss the role of
demand elasticity in section 2.4.
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which we can rewrite as
c′′(E∗)<−c′(E∗)3,
and combing with the first and second order necessary conditions, we have the interval
−1
2
(c′(E∗))3 ≤ c′′(E∗)<−(c′(E∗))3. (2.56)
Therefore, the price falls if the second derivative of the cost function is sufficiently small
in equilibrium, relative to the first derivative, whilst not being too small that the firm does
not want to undertake R&D. Put differently, for the price to fall we require the marginal cost
reduction from innovation to be substantial and for this to be the case in equilibrium we
require the innovation function, c(E), to be not too convex (yet still convex enough to ensure
a solution). However, this condition is difficult to satisfy for functions that are strictly positive,
decreasing and convex; it is not satisfied for any function of the form c(E) = e−βE , β > 1.
Intuitively, this is because the marginal return to innovation must be large for innovation to
offset the effect of raised demand on prices, however, the marginal return to innovation is
likely low in equilibrium, or else the firm would want to spend more on R&D.
Informally, this analysis will generalize to the case of the primary good producers as
described above with an equivalent condition on the curvature of the cost function.5 It is
therefore unlikely that input prices will fall, however, the size of the pecuniary externality
will depend upon the marginal returns to innovation in equilibrium, as discussed above.
In summary, the key requirement for a demand shock to have a weakly positive effect on
R&D in all firms even when there are final good firms that share common suppliers with the
shocked firm, is for pecuniary externalities to be weakly positive. As discussed above, while
we do not rule out the theoretical possibility, this is unlikely to be the case. However, we
can also think about other settings where the direct effect of demand on prices is dominated
by increased innovation. For instance, threat of entry in input markets could force input
producers to price at or closer to marginal cost, reducing the direct effect of demand on input
prices. Alternatively, it is plausible that negative pecuniary externalities will be a short run
effect in response to a short run demand shock while innovation my be longer lasting, leading
to positive pecuniary externalities in the long run and therefore weakly positive innovation
responses for all firms in the long run. This is discussed in more detail in the next section
5By looking at a single firm we are abstracting from higher order feedback effects from the rest of the
players and are doing so to give clearer insight on how the pecuniary externality is determined.
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along with other extensions and modeling considerations. In general, however, we cannot
dismiss the possibility that a demand shock to one market may increase input prices in other
markets and therefore lead to reductions in innovation. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the
full production network and general equilibrium effects when studying the impact of demand
shocks on innovation.
2.4 Discussion and Areas for Further Work
In the analysis above we have assumed that final good producers face a linear inverse
demand function of the simple form Pi = ai −Xi. As mentioned above, this is done for ease
of exposition and more general expressions of demand would not affect the qualitative results
presented. However, it is worth noting that the price elasticity of demand would affect the
incentive for R&D expenditure. Intuitively, the more responsive demand is to price, the
greater the returns from reducing unit costs. This point has been noted before by Kamien
and Schwartz (1970).
Another important feature of our model is that R&D has the sole effect of reducing unit
costs. Alternatively, we could also think of R&D as improving product quality. In such
an alternative setting, under linear demand, our results would be still largely unchanged;
however, as noted by Spence (1975), the return from improvements in product quality would
be higher under inelastic demand. Therefore, although the base model can be used to guide
empirical work that uses either product or process innovation, to analyze the affect of demand
elasticity, a distinction must be made between the two types of innovation.
Our base model also takes the market for each good to be a monopoly. This can be
extended, though less tractably, to have many firms producing each unique primary good and
or multiple firms that produce in each local final goods market and compete with each other
by Cournot competition, see Draca and Carvalho (2017). Doing so leaves the results above
mostly unchanged, since we can think of the monopoly setting as a special case; however,
as mentioned above, greater competition amongst input producers will move prices closer
to marginal cost and reduce the direct effect of demand on input prices. If we alternatively
supposed that firms for each good competed by Bertrand competition, we would not have a
Nash equilibrium as firms would have an incentive to do marginally more R&D and take the
whole market.
It should also be noted that a more general setting would be to allow each final good
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producer to require the inputs in different fixed proportions, rather than all final good firms
requiring all inputs at the same amount per unit output. We conjecture that, in such a model,
primary good firms with relatively stronger links to a final good firm that experiences a
demand shock would intuitively have relatively stronger innovation responses. However,
such a model is substantially less tractable and is left to further work.
For the purpose of empirical analysis, it is also important to note that our model is a static
model of innovation; although the game is structured in three stages, firms profits are only
realized once. Future work could develop a model where firms exist over many periods and
innovation affects processes and products in the long run as well as the short term. In such a
setting, we conjecture the impact of an exogenous and unexpected short term demand shock
to one firm’s final good market could be different in the short and long term. Intuitively, in
the short term, the shock could raise R&D expenditure by the firm that receives the shock
and all of its suppliers, while also raising input prices through higher demand. In the long
term, as demand recedes, input prices fall lower than their initial level due to the permanent
effect of innovation by the input producing firms, in turn spurring other final good producers
to increase innovation.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a model of demand-led innovation that gives attention to the supply
chain in which firms operate. We succeeded in developing empirically important theoretical
predictions from a model with a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Our results
suggest that a positive demand shock to some final good market can increase innovation
amongst input producers by percolating up the supply chain. However, we also find that this
positive effect may be off-set by increased input prices. It is therefore crucial to understanding
the effective impact of demand shocks on innovation to consider the broader supply chain
and general equilibrium effects. Our model represents a foundation for existing and potential
empirical work on the effects of demand shocks and supply chains on innovation. In
particular, our results suggest that the net increase in innovation from demand shocks may be
overestimated where one fails to account for negative feedback via common suppliers. As
discussed, a potentially fruitful extension of the work presented here would be a model that
explicitly incorporates a dynamic structure and studies the long-term effects of short-term
demand shocks.
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Appendix 2.A
2.A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1




















































By inspection, since the diagonal elements are negative and falling in a1 and ∂Xi∂a c
′(Ei)> 0
for i = 1,2, it must be that detM,detM1,detM2 > 0, for sufficiently large a1. By Cramer’s







Therefore, since detM,detM1,detM2 > 0, it must be that ∂Ei∂a1 > 0 for i = 1,2
2.A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Let M be as defined as in Section 2.3.2 and denote by Mi the matrix formed by replacing the
















We will prove that ∂Ei
∂a > 0 for all i and any m, by showing that detMi and detM are of the
same sign. We prove this by induction.
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First note that by Lemma 2.1 we have a basis step. Now suppose the result holds for
some m = k. Therefore, detMi(m = k) and detM(m = k) are of the same sign. If we now add
an additional primary firm and consider detM(m = k+1). Taking the Laplace expansion for
column k+1, for large a, the sign of the determinant will be opposite of the k+1,k+1 minor.
However, the k+1,k+1 minor is simply detM(m = k). Moreover, this equivalently holds
for detMi(m = k+1), since its sign, for large a, will be opposite the sign of detMi(m = k).
Therefore, the signs of detMi(m = k) and detM(m = k) must be the same, implying ∂Ei∂a > 0.
Finally, note that we can interchange the rows of M in this proof without loss of generality
such that this holds for all i.
2.A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.2
We can rewrite the system described by (2.7) as
(I+11T )P = α1+ c,








and c is the vector (c(En+1), . . . ,c(En+m))T . Therefore, multiplying both sides by
(I− 1m+111
T ), we have
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Modeling Choice as a Markovian
Decision Process Over Emotional States1
3.1 Introduction
The standard method for modeling choice in economics is utility maximization. Whilst
highly tractable and versatile, the utility maximization approach has difficulty dealing with
emotional states, such as anger and frustration. A now substantial literature in psychology
and neuroscience demonstrates the crucial role of emotional states of mind in economic
decision making. As such, there is great need for an approach to modeling choice that better
captures the role of emotion. Such an approach should allow for economic decisions to
depend upon both an individual’s current emotional state as well as introspection about how
choices will affect their future emotional state.
In this essay we therefore develop a new approach to modeling individual choice. We
model preferences as a Markovian decision process over emotional states. In this setting
consumption choices do not necessarily return a direct utility to the agent. Instead, choices
affect the individual’s emotional state, from which they derive a utility. As an example, an
individual may be in a hungry emotional state that returns a low flow utility. Eating does
not necessarily return a utility to the agent in and of itself but transitions the individual to
a non-hungry emotional state that returns a higher flow utility. Specifically, a transition
function maps from the individual’s current state and choice into probability distributions
1This essay was produced in collaboration with Dr. Matthew Elliott.
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over the individual’s future emotional states.2 Another example would be an individual that
is in a frustrated emotional state that is very unpleasant and so they make choices that will
likely move them to a more pleasant state. However, the choices that move them to a more
pleasant emotional state when frustrated may well be different from when the agent is not
frustrated. For instance, they may have to take a specific action to alleviate their frustration
that they would not otherwise take. In this sense our model can naturally accommodate
dynamic inconsistencies in choice where the realization of a certain emotional state leads to
a different decision. That is to say, choices that would be inter-temporally inconsistent within
the standard choice framework, through a violation of the Generalized Axiom of Revealed
Preferences, can be naturally incorporated. We apply our approach to model single agent
decision problems as well as a two agent, game theoretic bargaining/concession model.
Our framework draws upon a rich literature on Markovian decision processes (MDPs)
and dynamic programing in economics (see Rust (1996)). Our primary departure is the
reinterpretation of the state space as emotional states of mind and the construction of decision
processes that capture specific empirical phenomena from work in behavioural economics,
psychology and neuroscience. Our first result pertains to the capacity to capture the standard
choice models within a MDP framework. Specifically we show that whenever preferences
over deterministic choices and lotteries can be represented by a utility function, we can
capture the same preferences within a MDP over states of mind.
We focus on two main applications motivated by neurological data from experiments on
economic decision making. The first application is to frustration during repeated gambling
on a fixed odds betting terminal. As discussed in detail below, experimental work by Clark
et al. (2009) and others shows that ‘near-miss’ losses in these games are reported as less
pleasant than normal losses and are correlated with an increased desire to continue play,
raised heart rate, raised electro-dermal activity, and recruitment of striatal and insula brain
circuitry (associated with, amongst other things, emotion and emotional processing). Whilst
these phenomena are difficult to explain using standard expected utility or prospect theory,
we are readily able to capture these features in our framework by employing a model where
near miss losses move the agent to a frustrated emotional state.
Our second application is to anger in negotiations. Here we apply our choice framework
to a game theoretic setting. Two agents bargain over some surplus, repeatedly and simultane-
2Danziger et al. (2011) provide evidence that hunger can even effect judicial decisions, finding that parole
request approvals fall from about 65% just after a judge’s food break to almost zero just before their next.
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ously committing concessions to each other. If either player feels the other is not committing
sufficient concessions they may transition to an angry emotional state. In this unpleasant
angry state they have an incentive to break off negotiations and walk away in order to move
to a more pleasant state of mind. The game is similar to the widely studied Ultimatum game
in the sense that each round features ‘take it or leave it’ offers, however, the repetition and
symmetric balance of power model more closely the features of real world negotiations.
Substantial empirical evidence on the Ultimatum game shows that agents will reject
offers of around 20 percent of the total surplus around half the time (see Roth (1995)). As
discussed in detail below, the neurological studies of Sanfey et al. (2003) and others suggest
that these rejections are driven by the relative strength of activation in the anterior insula (a
region of the brain frequently associated with pain, distress and disgust) and the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (typically associated with cognitive processes related to goal maintenance).
This is broadly supportive of the idea that offers perceived as unfair elicit an angry emotional
response which may dominate the monetary benefit of accepting the offer.
We find that over plausible parameter values the game exhibits a unique symmetric
equilibrium; both players offer a fixed proportion of the remaining surplus to each other
every round, resulting in delay and inefficiency as negotiations break down with certainty.
This is driven entirely by the possibility of agents transitioning to an angry state; there is no
asymmetric information in the model, unlike most models that exhibit delay in bargaining.
When players are less prone to transitioning to the angry state, concessions are lower;
intuitively, there is less incentive for agents not to shade their concessions downward.
Our application to bargaining is related to work on gradualism in public good contribu-
tions, see Admati and Perry (1991) and Compte and Jehiel (2004). In particular, Compte and
Jehiel develop a model where agents alternately make sunk contributions to a joint project
and may stop contributing at any point, resulting in inefficient partial completion of the
project. They show that the threat of breaking off the project leads agents to make gradual
contributions. The strategic reasoning behind their result—namely, agents contribute gradu-
ally due to the possibility for the other party to take advantage of a large contribution made
too quickly—is close to our model; however, in our framework termination is always the
result of an agent transitioning to an angry emotional state and the ‘credibility’ of breaking
off negotiations is determined by the function mapping concessions into the probability of a
state transition.
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Our bargaining application is also related to theoretical work that seeks to explain
experimental results on the Ultimatum game through specific formulations of utility, see
Levine (1998) and Guha (2017). This work typically models agents’ utility to depend
upon both their own consumption and that of the other party. The specific form of utility
may capture ‘spiteful’, ‘malicious’ or ‘jealous’ preferences. We would suggest that the
neurological evidence described is more consistent with a framework where agents’ other
regarding preferences are activated by an emotional response, as in our model, rather than a
consistent preference shown by (some) individuals.
Our choice framework is closely related to that of Bernheim and Rangel (2004) on
addiction and cue-triggered decision processes. They propose a model of addiction where
each period the agent chooses a lifestyle and whether or not to consume an addictive substance.
Their lifestyle choice determines the level of environmental cues that they are exposed to.
These cues may trigger them to transition to a ‘hot’ mode. In this state they always consume
the substance. Alternatively, if they remain in their initial ‘cold’ mode, they may choose
whether or not to consume the substance. Past use increases sensitivity to environmental cues
but does not increase the marginal benefit of future consumption. While their model may
be interpreted in light of our framework by viewing the hot and cold modes as emotional
states of mind, a key difference is that in their approach the hot and cold modes do not return
instantaneous utility to the agent. Rather, the hot mode simply constrains the consumption
decision. Moreover, the consumption decision itself does not have any effect on the agents
state of mind, only a direct utility return.
Our framework also bears some similarity to work on interactive trial and error learning
in games by Young (2009). This work develops a learning rule where different search
procedures are triggered by different psychological states or ‘moods’. Mood changes depend
upon the difference between an agent’s realized and expected payoff. Four emotional states
and specific transition rules between these states are assumed but not justified empirically.
The learning rule developed implements Nash equilibrium behaviour. Unlike the model
presented here, psychological states do not return utility to the agent that influences their
choice.
The remainder of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 3.2 lays out our basic
framework and demonstrates that our approach is sufficiently general to capture standard
choice models; namely, both deterministic and uncertain choice models. Section 3.3 applies
our framework to repeated gambling. Section 3.4 looks at an application to negotiation and
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bargaining. Section 3.5 provides discussion and conclusions.
3.2 Model
For the decision maker (DM), choice is represented by a discrete-time Markovian decision
process. This consists of the following objects:
• a time index t ∈ {0,1, . . . ,T}, T ≤ ∞;
• a choice set, C;
• a finite state space, S, interpreted as the DM’s possible states of mind;
• a family of transition probabilities, Pc(s,s′) = Pr[st+1 = s′|st = s,ct = c];
• an instantaneous reward function ū : S → R, which is independent of c;
• and a discount factor δ ∈ [0,1], such that the DM’s total utility from state stream
(s0,s1, . . . ,sT ) is






The DM maximizes the expected discounted sum of instantaneous utility. Their problem
amounts to finding an optimal policy function π : {0,1, . . . ,T}× S → C. Under certain
weak regularity conditions (see Bäuerle and Rieder (2011)), an optimal, non-randomized,
Markovian policy function exists. In the finite horizon case, this can be computed by
backward induction. For the infinite horizon case, standard dynamic programing techniques,
such as value function iteration or policy function iteration, may be used.
While in our basic model instantaneous rewards depend only on the current state of mind,
we can also use a more partial approach where the agent’s instantaneous utility may have a
component that depends directly on their choices or the choices of others. We restrict our
models to finite state space MDPs. As we will show, this framework is sufficient to represent
any preferences represented by a utility function approach. The model could also be extended
to include a family of constraint sets, {Ct(st)⊆C}, directly limiting the agent’s action space
based on their state of mind.
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3.2.1 Comparison with Standard Choice Models
We now compare our model of individual choice with standard choice models. We first
show that any preferences that admit a utility representation can also be represented by
a MDP. We then discus how a standard utility function can rationalize any choice stream
generated by a MDP over emotional states but only for a choice set that indexes each choice
by emotional state.
Suppose a DM has a preference ordering, ≿, over a choice set, C. We say that this
preference ordering admits a utility representation if there exists a real valued function
u : C → R, such that
ci ≿ c j ⇔ u(ci)≥ u(c j).
We will say that a preference ordering admits a MDP representation if there exists a MDP
with choice set C such that
ci ≿ c j ⇔ E(U(ci))≥ E(U(c j)),
where E(U(c)) is the expected discounted sum of instantaneous utility when the DM chooses
c every period.
Proposition 3.1. Any preference ordering, ≿, over some choice set, C, that admits a utility
representation, also admits a MDP representation.
Proof: Since ≿ admits a utility representation, there exists a real valued function u : C → R,
such that ci ≿ c j ⇔ u(ci)≥ u(c j). Therefore, we can construct the following MDP:
• there exist two periods, t = 0 and t = 1;
• the choice set is C;
• the state space is S = {g,b}, where b is the initial state;









• instantaneous rewards are ū(b) = 0, ū(g) = max
x∈C
u(x), and δ = 1.
Therefore we have a MDP where the expected discounted value from choosing ci is








This completes the proof.
Note that the transition probabilities and state rewards could have been constructed in
many different ways; we only require that the expected return from a choice is a monotone
transform of u(ci) and that transition probabilities lie between zero and one. Furthermore, we
could have considered a MDP of any horizon with the same transition probabilities, rewards
and any discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).
The above proposition applies to any preferences that can be represented by a utility
function. Some specific examples therefore include the following:
1. When the C is finite and ≿ is complete and transitive, u(ci) = |≿ (ci)| represents ≿,
where ≿ (ci) = {c j ∈C|ci ≿ c j} is the lower contour set of ci. We can then use this
utility function as above to construct a MDP representation.
2. More generally, when C is some topological space and C and ≿ satisfy the axioms of
Debreu et al. (1983), we have both a utility and MDP representation.
3. When C is a set of lotteries, L , defined over a set of n outcomes, X . By von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944), if the DM has a preference relation over L that is a complete
and transitive partial order which also satisfies continuity and independence, then
it admits an expected utility representation. That is to say, there exists a function
û : X → R, such that for any L,L′ ∈ L ,










and therefore we also have a MDP representation using the construction above. Note
that in this case we could alternatively use a construction that sets the state space equal
to the outcome set, instantaneous utilities equal to û(xi), and transition probabilities
equal to the lotteries’ probabilities over outcomes.
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It is worth noting that we have shown it is possible to represent any preferences that
admit a utility representation with a MDP over only two states of mind and only cared about
transition probabilities to the more pleasant state of mind. In general we can utilize MDP
models with more than two states of mind and, more importantly, asymmetries in how agents
transition between states. For instance, you could consider three states of mind that are
ranked in terms of pleasure, say ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘awful’, where the choices that move you
to a more pleasant emotional state when in the worst state of mind may be different from
the choices that are likely to maintain a good state of mind. Moreover, it may be harder to
improve your state of mind the worse your state of mind is. That is to say, the same given
choice has a lower probability of improving your state of mind when your current state of
mind is less pleasant.
However, it is crucial to acknowledge a potential weakness of our proposed framework.
By introducing emotional states our model is less parsimonious and could potentially explain
any set of choices with a large enough space of emotional states and ad hoc transition rules,
jeopardizing falsifiability. We therefore stress the importance of drawing upon neurological
and physiological evidence in justifying the existence of and transition rules for an emotional
state when applying our MDP framework.
Note also that, while we have shown that any preferences over a choice set C that can
be captured by a utility function can also be captured by a MDP, it is generally the case
that the stream of decisions generated by a MDP over emotional states S and a choice set
C cannot be rationalized by a utility function with domain C. Intuitively, a change in the
agent’s emotional state may lead them to choose A over B when they previously chose B over
A while faced with the same choice set, generating a violation of the Generalized Axiom of
Revealed Preferences. A sufficient condition for a utility function to rationalize any choice
stream generated by a MDP over emotional states S and choice set C, is that its domain
is S×C. That is to say, a utility mapping from a given choice in a given emotional state.
Formally, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.2. Any stream of choice data generated by a stationary MDP with choice set
C, finite set of emotional states S, and a unique optimal non-randomized policy function can
be rationalized by a utility function with domain C×S.
Proof: See appendix.
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It should be noted, however, that although such a function could rationalize decisions, it
would not keep track of how choices affect future emotional states.
3.3 Frustration and Gambling
We now turn our attention to an application that demonstrates how our framework can
allow specific emotional states, such as ‘frustration’. We build a behavioural model of
frustration in gambling that explains otherwise hard to account for empirical phenomena.
There is a substantial literature in psychology on decision making in gambling games.
One branch of this research addresses the role of frustration on an agent’s desire to continue
gambling. Clark et al. (2009) study the role of ‘near-miss’ events on motivation to continue
gambling. Specifically, they expose test subjects to a gambling game typical to many
commercial fixed-odds betting terminals in which agents pay to spin a number of wheels
and are rewarded if they stop at matching points. A near-miss event is where one wheel
stops just before or after it needs to for a winning payout. Although these outcomes are
equivalent to any other non-payout event, test subjects report these events as less pleasant
but also demonstrate an increased desire for continued play following a near-miss. Clark et
al. demonstrate that near-miss events recruited striatal and insula brain circuitry associated
with, amongst other things, emotion and emotional processing. In a later study, Clark et al.
(2012) found that heart rate and electro-dermal activity is also raised in response to near-miss
events. In a similar experiment, Côté et al. (2003), in a real stakes environment, compared a
treatment group exposed to near misses with a control group that experienced no near-misses.
They found that near-miss events increased the average time agents gambled for by a third.
To explain these results within a standard utility framework it must either be that near-
misses have a higher utility than full-misses or that agents incorrectly update beliefs based
on near-miss outcomes. However, since agents report near-miss events as less pleasant and
given no clear evidence for how or why agents might be updating their beliefs upon near-miss
events, a standard utility approach seems unsatisfactory for modeling observed behaviour.
Barberis (2012) models casino gambling using ‘Prospect Theory’, as developed by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Time-inconsistency in their model can cause agents who are
losing to gamble longer than intended but this cannot capture near-miss effects.
We offer an alternative model utilizing a MDP over emotional states. Our model is
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Figure 3.1: Transition probabilities between states when the agent chooses ‘play’.
constructed to capture the empirical phenomena described above. A DM plays on a fixed
odds betting terminal where the outcome of each gamble may be a win, a full-miss, or a
near-miss. Our setup ensures they are initially risk loving and will play, with wins moving
them to or maintaining a good state of mind and losses moving them to or maintaining a bad
state of mind. They play until they become ‘bored’ or content enough with their wins to ‘quit
while ahead’. However, if they experience a near-miss loss they may move to a ‘frustrated’
state of mind. In line with the empirical findings, this returns a low utility and requires a win
outcome to alleviate this emotional state. As a consequence, near miss outcomes may cause
the agent to play longer than they otherwise would have. It is not our aim to offer either a
definitive model of gambling behviour or the simplest possible model with extended play
after near-miss events; rather, we aim to demonstrate as a proof of concept the efficacy of the
MDP framework in capturing empirical phenomena on the decision to continue gambling
described above. Specifically, we assume:
• T = ∞ periods;
• a choice set C = {play, don’t play};
• five states of mind that we can think of as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘frustrated’, ‘neutral’ (or
‘bored’), and ‘success’, S = {g,b, f ,n,s};
• the agent may start in the good or bad state;
• if at any point the agent chooses not to play, she stays in her current state;
• when she plays, the transition probabilities are summarized by Figure 3.1;
• one can think of these probabilities as:
3.3 Frustration and Gambling 71
– α the probability of a win,
– β the probability of a near-miss,
– λn the probability of becoming bored after a loss,
– λs the probability of deciding to ‘quit while ahead’ after a win,
• the discount factor is δ and the instantaneous return for states of mind are
ū(g) = πg, ū(b) = πb, ū( f ) = π f , ū(n) = πn, ū(s) = πs.
The five states of mind in this model correspond to three states where the DM typically
will continue play (‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘frustrated’) and two where the DM will typically stop
playing. The two stopping states are: 1. where they become bored after a loss (‘neutral’) and
2. where they contentedly ‘quit while ahead’ after a win when already happy (‘success’).
Two exiting states is the minimum required to capture the observed empirical behaviour.3
Note that we assume a specific number of emotional states and restrict transitions between
some states; for instance, it is not possible in our model to become frustrated directly from
the good state. While our assumptions on transitions are plausible given the existing evidence
and capture observed behaviour (shown below), a proper justification of these assumptions
would require further experiment and neurological evidence.
This is a stationary, infinite-horizon MDP. A (stationary) policy function in this setting is a
decision rule to play or not play for each state of mind. If we ‘guess’ that the optimal policy is
for the agent to play in states g,b, f and not play otherwise, we can calculate the continuation
value of each state. Since the agent does not play at n and s, the continuation value of these









where V (σ) is the continuation value of state σ . This leaves us with a linear system of three
equations in three unknowns for the continuation values of the remaining states. We can
solve this system analytically; in particular, we have the following lemma on the form of the
solution.
3Note it is possible to construct a model that replaces the good and bad states with a single emotional state
and still capture the impact of near-misses and frustration on play time. However, such a model does not capture
how the DM’s mood may improve or worsen after wins and losses (apart from becoming frustrated) which may
be important for modeling observed gambling behaviour more generally.
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Lemma 3.1. When the DM plays in states g,b, f and does not play otherwise, the continua-














The expressions for γσ for all σ ∈ S are given in the appendix. We can therefore form
the following characterization for when our proposed policy function is optimal.
Proposition 3.3. It is a unique optimal policy for the agent to play in states g,b, f and not
play otherwise if and only if the following conditions hold:
πg
1−δ








≤ γ f ·π ≤ πn
1−δ
.
Proof: Follows immediately from the proof of Lemma 3.1 and the ‘one-shot deviation
property’.
Intuitively, these conditions require that play is sufficiently rewarding in both the good
and bad states of mind that the DM wants to continue playing. If this is not satisfied, the
agent might stop as soon as they reach the good state of mind. It is also required that being
frustrated is sufficiently unpleasant that when bored they do not wish to play.
For illustration, we now consider a specific example that falls within these conditions.
Suppose, when the agent plays they win 30% of the time, 20% of the time they will have a
near-miss loss, and 50% of the time they will have a full-miss loss. That is to say, α = 0.3
and β = 0.2. Further suppose that λn = 0.1, λs = 0.2, δ = 0.95, and that instantaneous
payoffs are
πg = 1,πb =−1,π f =−4,πn = 0,πs = 4.
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In this case, we have that the continuation values are approximately V (g)≈ 21.0, V (b)≈ 4.9,
and V ( f )≈−7.8, which satisfy the conditions of Proposition 3.3.
The optimal policy induces a Markov chain. For our example this is summarized by the
following transition probability matrix,
P =

0.1 0.6 0 0.1 0.2
0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0
0 0.3 0.7 0 0
0 0 0 1 0







where I2x2 is the two by two identity matrix and 0 is the two by three null matrix.
This is an absorbing Markov chain with two absorbing states, namely n and s. To calculate
the expected number of steps before reaching an absorbing state (i.e. the expected time spent
gambling) we can use the fundamental matrix,
N = (I3x3 −Q)−1.
The expected number of steps starting from state i, is then given by the ith element of the
vector
t = N1,
where 1 is the three by one vector of ones. Doing this calculation we find that the expected
number of times the agent plays is approximately 10 rounds when they start in the bad state.
When they start in the good state, the expected play time is approximately 7.8 rounds.
We can compare this to a benchmark case of no near miss events; as in the experiment
of Côté et al. (2003), discussed above. Specifically, suppose we remove the possibility to
transfer to the frustrated state from the bad state; therefore, the only way the agent can
become frustrated is if they play in the bored state. That is to say, we set β = 0. In this case
the optimal policy is unchanged but the expected time spent playing falls to approximately
6.7 periods, starting in the bad state, and approximately 5.6 periods, starting in the good state.
Therefore, removing near miss events reduces expected playtime by roughly one third, in
line with Côté et al.
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More generally, we have the following result on the impact of the near miss probability
on expected playtime starting in state σ , E(play time|σ).





Note that in our analysis we could have allowed for more states; for instance, we could
have allowed for the DM to be forced to stop while frustrated with some probability. This does
not change the qualitative results but naturally gives the frustrated state a lower continuation
value and slightly reduces play time. Moreover, we could have placed a restriction that the
DM must play in the frustrated state even if it is suboptimal, as in the ‘hot’ mode in the model
of Bernheim and Rangel (2004). This would be closer to the interpretation that play while
frustrated is a ‘mistake’, rather than a justified attempt to alleviate an unpleasant emotional
state.
3.4 Anger, Concessions and Negotiation
We have so far focused on single agent decision making applications. We turn now to a
two player concession/bargaining game where both players’ preferences are captured by a
MDP over emotional states.
There is a significant body of work in psychology and neuroscience on emotional states
and their impact on decision making in games. Much of this work focuses on the ‘Ultimatum
Game’. In this game, one player proposes a split of some nominal amount of money between
themselves and the other player, who in turn either accepts or rejects the offer. In a standard
utility theory setting where both players are assumed to simply have an increasing and
positive value for money, one would not predict the responding player to reject any proposal
that gives them a positive amount and the proposer would offer the smallest possible amount
to the responder. However, a large body of experimental work finds that modal offers are
typically around a 50 percent split and amounts about 20 percent of the total are rejected
around half of the time (see Roth (1995)).
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Given the simplicity of the game and multitude of studies, it is unlikely that participants
are misunderstanding the rules of the game or the one-shot interaction with another player
(see Camerer and Thaler (1995)). A prominent explanation for the observed rejections is
that offers the responder perceives to be unfair elicit anger. In this angry emotional state the
responder spitefully rejects the split (see Pillutla and Murnighan (1996)).
Sanfey et al. (2003) studied the neurological responses of responders during an ultimatum
game using fMRI. They found that unfair offers resulted in activation of the bilateral anterior
insula and participants with a stronger anterior insula activation in response to an unfair
offer were more likely to reject. Anterior insula activation is frequently associated with pain,
distress and disgust. They also find activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
typically associated with cognitive processes related to goal maintenance. The authors offer
tentative evidence that the probability of rejection depends upon the relative strength of
activation in the anterior insula verses the DLPFC. Their findings have been supported by
further fMRI studies, see Tabibnia et al. (2008) and Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al. (2013).
Other work has looked at the effect of brain damage on participants’ rejection rates in the
Ultimatum game, see Koenigs et al. (2007) and Koenigs and Tranel (2007). In particular, it
has been found that individuals with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC)
have a higher rejection rate for unfair offers. The VMPC is associated with, among other
things, the regulation of emotion.
The above findings are consistent and supportive of a model within our framework where
the responder has two states of mind, namely, a neutral and an angry state. Unfair offers
have a probability of transferring the agent to the angry state where they have a preference to
reject the offer. From this observation we construct the following model of concessions and
negotiation that moves beyond a simple one round ultimatum game to study bargaining more
generally when agents may become angry. We find that equilibrium play exhibits delay and
inefficiency as negotiations break down. We look at how the expected length of negotiations
and expected efficiency depends upon the probability that agent’s transition to the angry
state.
Two agents negotiate over some surplus. Initially they are both in a neutral state of mind.
However, if one agent feels the other is not making sufficient concessions toward an equitable
split, they may move to an ‘angry’ state of mind. In an angry state of mind their preference is
to break off negotiations. Specifically, suppose we have the following:
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• two players, i = 1,2;
• an infinite horizon, t = 1,2,3, . . . ;
• there is some initial surplus, S1;
• each period both players simultaneously offer a concession cit ∈ [0,1];
• a concession is a proportion of the remaining surplus;
• after the concessions are offered, players may choose to break off negotiations;
• if negotiations are broken off after offers in period t, players do not receive period t
concessions and no further offers are made;
• if negotiations are not broken off and c1t +c2t ≤ 1, both players receive the concession
of the other player, c jtSt , and negotiations move to the next round, with the new
remaining surplus St+1 = St(1− c1t − c2t);
• if negotiations are not broken off and c1t + c2t > 1, players 1 and 2 receive
1
2
(1+ c2t − c1t)St and
1
2
(1+ c1t − c2t)St ,
respectively, and no further rounds of negotiations are played;
• both agents have two states of mind, ‘neutral’ and ‘angry’, Σ = {n,a};
• both agents start in the neutral state;
• after concessions are offered in period t, the probability agent i transitions to the angry
state is given by f (c jt), where f (·) is a decreasing function;
• for now we assume f (c jt) = 1− c jtα , where α ∈ (0,1);
• an agent transitions from the angry state to the neutral state if and only if they break
off negotiations;
• if an agent starts a period in state σ , they receive the instantaneous return for that state,
u(σ);
• the instantaneous returns to states of mind are
ū(n) = 0, ū(a) =−u;
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• δ is the common discount factor, assumed for now to be 1. Allowing for lower discount
factors does not affect our qualitative results.
Note that we assume a simultaneous offers set-up where the threat of termination is driven
entirely by transitions to an angry emotional state. Concessions are ‘sunk’ in the sense that
they are instantly received by the other party and are not degraded in the event of a break
down in negotiations; allowing such degradation would not effect our qualitative results.4
Our assumed functional form for the transition probability to the angry emotional state is
selected largely for tractability; however, a concave reduction in the probability of becoming
angry as the other player’s concession increases is plausible. A richer framework could allow
this transition to depend upon both players’ entire histories of concessions. Additionally, a
logistic function may better approximate agents transition dynamics, rather than a bounded
exponential function.
We can think of this game as a standard extensive form game where the transition to the
angry state is a move made by ‘nature’. We solve for subgame prefect Nash equilibrium
(SPE). The unique SPE will exhibit breakdown of negotiations and inefficiency. Subsequently,
we will consider comparative statics on the primitive α to understand how the probability
of transitioning to the angry state affects the expected length of time before negotiations
breakdown and their expected inefficiency.
First note that in any subgame where a player is in the angry state, it is a dominant strategy
for them to break off negotiations. If they did not break off negotiations they will receive
a payoff of −u forever, which is not compensated for by any outcome of the negotiations,
since δ = 1.
Next, suppose there is a SPE where both agents offer a proportion of the remaining
surplus to each other as a concession every period. If the proportions are always less than
one half, there will always be some surplus left on the table after each round. In this case,
the problem of choosing an optimal proportion to concede is stationary. Consequently, both
players will offer the same fixed proportion as a concession every period. In particular, we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. For any SPE in which there is always positive surplus remaining at the end
4This is in contrast to Compte and Jehiel (2004) where gradualism is the consequence of termination threats
that must be strategically credible and contributions do degrade in the event of a break down in negotiations.
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of every period, both players offer the same fixed proportion of the remaining surplus as a








Intuitively, in any SPE when there is always positive remaining surplus, each player’s
continuation value from the game depends only on the remaining surplus. The basic trade-off
they face is that an increased concession increases the probability the game continues but
reduces the remaining surplus and therefore the continuation value of the game. Solving
for an agent’s optimal concession in the recursive formulation and by symmetry we get the
condition characterizing equilibrium F(c) = 0.
We prove the following proposition by showing that this condition has a unique solution
on the unit interval and, by the Implicit Function Theorem, this solution is increasing in α .
Proposition 3.5. There exists a unique SPE for sufficiently small α . Both players offer the
same proportion of remaining surplus as a concession every period, c ∈ (0,0.5), where c is
increasing in α .
Proof: See appendix.
Solving numerically, we can show that for α to be sufficiently small we require α < ᾱ ,
where ᾱ ≈ 0.32. If we use a calibration based on Roth (1995), where offers of 20 percent of
the surplus lead to breakdown of negotiations 50 percent of the time, this suggests a value for
α of about 0.22. In this case, we have a unique symmetric equilibrium where both players
offer c ≈ 0.35 (35 percent of the remaining surplus) as a concession every period. Therefore,
the expected number of rounds of negotiation is geometrically distributed with a mean of
approximately 2.4 and a standard deviation of around 1.9. The expected utility of each agent
is approximately 27 percent of the initial surplus, meaning the expected inefficiency, defined
as the expected surplus unallocated, is 46 percent.
Comparative statics on α are summarized in Figure 3.2. Specifically, we solve the
model numerically for α ≤ 0.32, and calculate the expected number of rounds (which is
geometrically distributed) and the standard deviation in number of rounds. We also calculate
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(a) Equilbrium concession (b) Expected no. of rounds
(c) Standard deviation in no. of rounds (d) Expected inefficiency
Figure 3.2: Equilbrium outcomes as functions of α
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the expected inefficiency for a give α . From Proposition 3.5 we know that the amount
conceded each period is lower when α is lower. That is to say, when agents are less likely
to become angry for any given offer, the amount players concede each period is lower. The
impact of this on the expected number of rounds of negotiation is non-monotonic, with
the expected number of rounds rising slightly as α approaches 0.32. This is because the
increase in the size of concessions made off-sets the effect of a higher α on the probability
of transitioning to the angry state for a given offer. Expected inefficiency falls monotonically
in α .
Specifically, to compare with our calibration above, when α is lower, say 0.1, the
concession in equilibrium given each period is lower at approximately 15 percent of the
remaining surplus. The expected number of round of negotiation is slightly higher at 2.9,
however, the expected utility of each agent is lower at 19 percent of the initial surplus.
Conversely, when α is higher than our initial calibration, say 0.3, such that players are more
likely to become angry, the concession in equilibrium is 0.47, almost half the remaining
surplus. The expected number of rounds of play is slightly higher than for α = 0.22 at
2.5, and expected utility for each player is approximately 31 percent of the initial surplus,
meaning expected inefficiency is lower at 38 percent of the initial surplus.
Our model predicts negotiation and bargaining to be subject to delay and breakdown even
in the absence of incomplete information. This occurs because, for any given concession plan
of the other agent, each player weighs up the cost of conceding more of the remaining surplus
against the threat of the other player transitioning to the angry emotional state and breaking
off negotiations. The less threat of the other player transitioning to the angry emotional state,
the more gradual the concessions. This is in contrast to much of the literature on gradualism
in bargaining that generates delay through incomplete information, signaling and reputation;
see Abreu and Gul (2000). However, these models often depend substantially on assumptions
about beliefs off the equilibrium path.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a new model of individual choice based on Markovian decision
processes. Choices transition the decision maker between states of mind that return a utility.
This approach allows choices to vary with the agent’s current emotional state, as well as
introspection about how choices may affect their future emotional state. Our applications
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demonstrate the efficacy of our framework in dealing with specific empirical phenomena
from work in psychology and neuroscience. Specifically, it is straightforward to capture
the role of unpleasant emotions such as anger and frustration in choice behaviour. Further
work should address the role of further emotional states in other economic applications.
Experimental work that more closely mirrors our model of concessions in negotiation would
also be illuminating.
Appendix 3.A
3.A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Consider a stream of choice data generated by a stationary MDP with choice set C, finite state
set S, and a unique optimal non-randomized policy function. This choice data consists of |S|
sets (specifically, Cs for each s ∈ S) and an observed choice rule R, where R(Cs)⊆Cs. We
say that this choice data is rationalized by a utility function u if the induced choice rule for
that utility function, R∗, equals the observed choice rule. That is to say, R∗(Cs,u) = R(Cs),
for all s ∈ S, where
R∗(Cs,u) = {xs ∈Cs|u(xs)≥ u(ys), ∀ys ∈ cs}.
A utility function that satisfies this condition is simply
u(xs) =V (x,s),
where V (x,s) is the expected continuation value of choice x in state s for the generating MDP.
To see that this utility function must rationalize the data, note that if this was not the case
then R∗(Cs,u) ̸= R(Cs) for some s ∈ S. Since we have a unique optimal policy function and a
stationary MDP, it cannot be the case that R(Cs)⊂ R∗(Cs,u). Therefore, it must be that there
is an observed choice that did not maximize the agent’s continuation value and so could not
have been consistent with the unique optimal policy function. Since we assumed the data
was generated by the solution to the MDP we have a contradiction, meaning V (x,s) must
rationalize the observed data.
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3.A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1.








which trivially are linear combinations of the instantaneous state payoffs. For the remaining
three states we have that
V (g) = δ
[
(α −λs)V (g)+(1−α −λn)V (b)+λnV (n)+λsV (s)
]
+πg (3.1)
V (b) = δ
[
αV (g)+(1−α −β −λn)V (b)+βV ( f )+λnV (n)
]
+πb (3.2)
V ( f ) = δ
[
αV (b)+(1−α)V ( f )
]
+π f (3.3)






















(1−δ )(1−δ (α −λs))
+
δ 2αλsπs
(1−δ )(1−δ (α −λs))
, (3.6)
where
























D(1−δ )(1−δ (α −λs))
, γbs =
δ 2αλs
D(1−δ )(1−δ (α −λs))
.
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b ·π + δλsπs
(1−δ )(1−δ (α −λs))
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δλnπn















δ 2β (1−α −λn)





δ 2λn(1+δλs)(1−α −λn)+Dδλn(1−δ (α −λs))
D(1−δ )(1−δ (α −λs))2
, γgs =
δ 3αλs(1−α −λn)+Dδλs(1−δ (α −λs))
D(1−δ )(1−δ (α −λs))2
.
And likewise, substituting (3.6) back into (3.5) we have













D(1−δ (α −λs))(1−δ (1−α))
, γ fb =
δα
D(1−δ (1−α))
, γ ff =







D(1−δ )(1−δ (α −λs))(1−δ (1−α))
, γ fs =
δ 3α2λs
D(1−δ )(1−δ (α −λs))(1−δ (1−α))
.
3.A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.4.
When the conditions in Proposition 3.3 hold, we have a unique optimal policy to play in
states g,b, f and not play otherwise. This policy induces a Markov chain with two absorbing
states. By the fundamental matrix associated with this Markov chain we have the following
relations on expected play time, where we write E(play time|σ) as Eσ for ease of notation,
Eg = λs +λn +(α −λs)(Eg +1)+(1−α −λn)(Eb +1) (3.9)
Eb = λn +α(Eg +1)+(1−α −β −λn)(Eb +1)+β (E f +1) (3.10)
E f = α(Eb +1)+(1−α)(E f +1) (3.11)
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3.A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.2.
Suppose there is surplus left on the table at the end of every period. Define V (S) as a player’s
expected continuation value from the game, when the remaining surplus is S. For any period















Sc j +V (S(1− ci − c j))
)
−SV ′(S(1− ci − c j))cαi cαj = 0. (3.19)
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We will now guess and verify that V (S) = βS, for some β . When V (S) = βS our first order
condition becomes
ci =
α(c j +β ((1− ci − c j)))
β
(3.20)
and by symmetry ci = c j, therefore,




From this we can write i’s expected payoff:
V (S) = Sc2α+1i +S(1−2ci)c
4α+1
i +S(1−2ci)





S(1−2ci)tc2(t+1)α+1i = βS, (3.22)
which verifies our guess that V (S) = βS. Furthermore, we can rewrite this infinite sum as




















3.A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5.
By Lemma 3.2, it remains to show that F(c) = 0 has a unique solution in (0,0.5). We first
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where a = α1+2α . Therefore, by intermediate value theorem, there exists at least one solution
in the interval (0,1). Moreover, this solution is unique since F(0) = 0 and F(c) is strictly













k = (1− c2α +2c2α+1)−2(c−α +2αc)−2 (3.28)
and therefore ∂F
∂c > 0 by inspection, so long as c ∈ (0,1). Since we have a unique solution in
the neighborhood ( α1+2α ,1) and F(c) is continuously differentiable over that neighborhood,











is positive if and only if ∂F
∂α






ln(c)(2c2α+1)(c−α +2αc)− c2(1− c2α +2c2α+1)
)
(3.30)
which is strictly negative in the interval ( α1+2α ,1).
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